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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Major Strasser has been shot . . . round up the usual suspects!”1 
 
Seconds after witnessing Rick Blaine shoot and kill a Nazi officer, 
Captain Louis Renault utters a lie that absolves Blaine of guilt and sends 
the murder investigation in another direction.2  And, in Blaine’s trial for 
the murder of Major Strasser, Captain Renault’s excited utterance that 
someone other than Blaine was the killer would be admitted—pursuant 
to the Federal Rules of Evidence—as proof that Blaine did not shoot 
Major Strasser, regardless whether Captain Renault testified at trial. 
Renowned Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner3 
recently questioned the efficacy of the excited utterance exception to the 
rule against hearsay,4 and called for changes to the manner in which the 
excited utterance exception and other hearsay exceptions are applied.5  
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 1.  CASABLANCA (Warner Brothers 1942).  Just before Rick Blaine—played by Humphrey 
Bogart in the film—shoots Major Strasser, Blaine threatened to kill Captain Renault by shooting 
him.  Whether the requisite “exciting event” is Blaine threatening Captain Renault’s life or Blaine 
killing Major Strasser, or both, undoubtedly the court would rule Captain Renault’s statement an 
excited utterance. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Judge Posner—the most cited legal scholar of the twentieth century—is regarded by many 
as America’s foremost living jurist.  Fred R. Shapiro, Most Cited Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 
424 tbl. 6 (2000).   
 4.  FED. R. EVID. 803(2).  The excited utterance exception is the second most popular hearsay 
exception of the twenty-three enumerated exceptions in Rule 803, at least within the last year.  From 
April 2013 to April 2014, there were 571 reported state and federal cases involving the question of 
whether an excited utterance may be admitted as a hearsay exception.  In that same time period, 602 
state and federal cases regarding the business records exception were reported, and only 157 present 
sense impression cases were reported.  Since 2000, there have been 8,268 reported cases involving 
the excited utterance in the federal and state court systems.  To reach these conclusions, the author 
researched and reviewed cases in the Westlaw database. 
 5.  United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799–803 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2321 (2014). 
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This Article attempts to expound on Judge Posner’s critique of the 
excited utterance exception and proposes a new rule of admissibility to 
remedy the excited utterance exception’s current flaws. 
II.   HEARSAY, RES GESTAE, AND THE EXCITED UTTERANCE 
EXCEPTION 
A. The Rule against Hearsay: Beginnings 
At its inception, the English jury system desired to seat as jurors only 
those community members who possessed personal knowledge regarding 
the facts of the case who then were expected to undertake their own 
investigation into the case,6 but by the seventeenth century English juries 
essentially became comprised of what we attempt to achieve today: an 
impartial group of citizens with no prior knowledge of the case that hears 
evidence presented by the opposing attorneys and then makes a just 
determination based on the facts presented at trial.7  Since jurors were no 
longer expected to rely on their own information and investigation 
regarding the case, what the attorneys presented as evidence became 
paramount.  Distrust of jurors and their ability to appropriately weigh the 
credibility of a witness’s trial testimony recounting someone else’s 
statement resulted in the rule against hearsay:8 an out-of-court statement, 
whether written or oral, offered for the truth asserted in that statement is 
inadmissible.9 
Borrowing from the English fear that juries might decide cases, in 
whole or in part, premised on gossip or second-hand information not 
subjected to cross-examination10 were such evidence admitted at trial,11 
                                                          
 6.  See, e.g., John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The 
Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 203–04 (1988). 
 7.  See, e.g., id. at 205. 
 8.  See, e.g., Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 
60 & n.37 (1987) (citing ALBERT SHERMAN OSBORN, THE MIND OF THE JUROR AS JUDGE OF THE 
FACTS, OR, THE LAYMAN’S VIEW OF THE LAW 51–52 (1937)) (“Yet, because of distrust of juries—a 
belief that jurors lack the competence to make allowance for the second-hand character of hearsay—
such evidence, although accepted by administrative agencies, juvenile courts and legislative 
committees, is (subject, to be sure, to numerous exceptions) barred in jury trials.” (quoting JEROME 
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 123 (1949))); Eleanor Swift, 
Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 495, 495–96 (1987) (stating that many scholars are 
critical of the rule against hearsay but also “are unwilling to risk requiring judges to defer entirely to 
the jury in evaluating the reliability of hearsay declarants”). 
 9.  FED. R. EVID. 801. 
 10.  Cross-examination “has always been regarded as the greatest safeguard of American trial 
procedure.”  United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 410 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting New 
York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
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American common law followed the English model and created a rule 
against hearsay disallowing out-of-court statements offered for their 
truth.12  Basically, hearsay is inherently unreliable because it cannot be 
                                                          
has concluded that “[t]he chief merit of cross examination is not that at some future time it gives the 
party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony.  Its principal virtue is in its immediate 
application of the testing process.  Its strokes fall while the iron is hot.”  State v. Saporen, 285 N.W. 
898, 901 (Minn. 1939).  Early legal commentators also weighed in, calling cross-examination “the 
most perfect and effectual system for the unraveling of falsehood ever devised by the ingenuity of 
mortals.”  Of the Disqualification of Parties as Witnesses, 5 AM. LEGAL REG. 257, 263–64 (1857).  
Professor John Henry Wigmore—one of America’s first and most notable evidence scholars—
penned the immortal phrase that cross-examination is “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine 
ever invented for the discovery of the truth.”  5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1974).  However, even Wigmore allowed that 
some hearsay must be admitted despite not being subjected to cross-examination:  
 
No one could defend a rule that pronounced that all statements thus untested are 
worthless, for all historical truth is based on un-cross-examined assertions and every 
day’s experience of life gives denial to such an exaggeration.  What the hearsay rule 
implies—with profound verity—is that all testimonial assertions ought to be tested by 
cross-examination, as the best attainable measure, and the rule should not be burdened 
with the pedantic implication that assertions must be rejected as worthless if the test is 
unavailable.  
 
1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 8c (Peter Tillers ed., 1983). 
 11.  The 1603 treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh provides one of the earliest examples why the 
English legal system became suspicious of hearsay, and why English evidentiary law developed a 
rule against the admission of hearsay.  1 THE SOCIETY FOR THE DIFFUSION OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE, 
CRIMINAL TRIALS 400–76 (1822).  Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death pursuant to the oral 
hearsay evidence of one witness (Dyer, testifying to the alleged hearsay statements of an unnamed 
Portuguese man) and the written hearsay evidence of another (Lord Cobham).  Id. at 434–36, 451–
52.  Raleigh pleaded, to no avail, to cross-examine the witnesses against him instead of allowing the 
hearsay evidence to stand untested: “Good my Lords, let my accuser come face to face and be 
deposed.  Were the case but for a small copyhold, you would have witnesses or good proof to lead 
the jury to a verdict; and I am here for my life!”  Id. at 427. 
 12.  Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 295 (1813).  Over two hundred years ago, 
United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall noted that: 
 
‘hearsay’ evidence is in its own nature inadmissible.  That this species of testimony 
supposes some better testimony which might be adduced in the particular case, is not the 
sole ground of its exclusion.  Its intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy the mind 
of the existence of the fact, and the frauds which might be practiced under its cover, 
combine to support the rule that hearsay evidence is totally inadmissible. 
 
Id. at 295–96.   
Early legal commentators also weighed in on the problem of admitting hearsay: “the reason of the 
rule is, because evidence ought to be given under the sanction of an oath, and that the person, who is 
to be affected by the evidence, may have an opportunity of interrogating the witness . . . .”  1 S. M. 
PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 173 (John A. Dunlap ed., 1st Am. ed. 1816).  
Judge Posner wrote in United States v. Boyce that “[o]ne reason that hearsay normally is 
inadmissible . . . is that it often is no better than rumor or gossip, and another, which is closely 
related, is that it can’t be tested by cross-examination of its author.”  742 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 
2014) (Posner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2321 (2014).   
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adequately probed and tested through cross-examination.13  However, if 
the ultimate goal of justice is divining the truth, and if admitting certain 
evidence furthers that goal, then, as long as that evidence is reliable, the 
common law recognized such evidence should be admitted.  Thus, by the 
early 1800s, a plurality of courts began acknowledging exceptions to the 
rule against hearsay14 because some out-of-court statements were thought 
to contain sufficient indicia of reliability to deem them worthy of 
admission into evidence:15 such exceptions were initially termed “res 
gestae.”16 
                                                          
 13.  See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 10, 
at §§ 1362, 1363.  In Donnelly, the Court explained that: 
 
The chief grounds of [hearsay evidence’s] exclusion are, that the reported declaration (if 
in fact made) is made without the sanction of an oath, with no responsibility on the part 
of the declarant for error or falsification, without opportunity for the court, jury, or parties 
to observe the demeanor and temperament of the witness, and to search his motives and 
test his accuracy and veracity by cross-examination, these being most important 
safeguards of the truth where a witness testifies in person, and as of his own knowledge; 
and, moreover, he who swears in court to the extrajudicial declaration does so (especially 
where the alleged declarant is dead) free from the embarrassment of present 
contradiction, and with little or no danger of successful prosecution for perjury.  It is 
commonly recognized that this double relaxation of the ordinary safeguards must very 
greatly multiply the probabilities of error, and that hearsay evidence is an unsafe reliance 
in a court of justice. 
 
Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added). 
 14.  For decades, however, legal scholars have derided American hearsay law as a 
“monstrosity: a tissue of doctrine that seems to function best when it is most transparent—that is, 
when it is essentially ignored.”  Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 
957 (1974) (citing Edward W. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REV. 
277, 277 (1952)).  Although Cleary was writing about evidence law in general, Professor Tribe 
opined that Cleary’s “observation may be most truly applicable to the hearsay rule and its 
exceptions.”  Id. 
 15.  See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance 
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 159, 168 (1997) (“[T]he admissibility of an 
excited utterance is justified by the purported trustworthiness of such statements.”).  
 16.   Res gestae “literally means ‘things done.’”  Id.  Legally, the term res gestae refers to 
“words spoken, thoughts expressed, and gestures made. . . [sic] so closely connected to occurrence 
or event in both time and substance as to be part of the happening.”  Id. at n.19 (quoting BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990)).  In the early 1800s, prior to hearsay doctrine being fully 
developed and its exceptions well defined, the term res gestae came into common legal usage “as a 
convenient vehicle for escape from the hearsay rule.”  KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 288  (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).  The term and its relationship to hearsay have 
been under fire for over a century.  See, e.g., James B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case—Declarations as 
a Part of the Res Gesta, 14 AM. L. REV. 817, 827 (1880) (“A term that cannot be defined should be 
dropped.”); Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res 
Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 229 (1922).  Morgan explained that:  
 
The marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning, and the 
confusion of thought inevitably accompanying the use of inaccurate terminology, are 
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The res gestae exceptions17 flowed from the concept that statements 
made during a legally relevant act were, in essence, part of that act and 
therefore should be admissible to explain the act.18  The original res 
gestae exceptions19 are generally considered to have included variations 
of the verbal acts doctrine,20 the dying declaration, a statement regarding 
state of mind or bodily condition, and a hybrid of the excited utterance 
and present sense impression.21  By definition, these res gestae 
                                                          
nowhere better illustrated than in the decisions dealing with the admissibility of evidence 
as ‘res gestae.’  It is probable that this troublesome expression owes its existence and 
persistence in our law of evidence to an inclination of judges and lawyers to avoid the 
toilsome exertion of exact analysis and precise thinking. 
 
Morgan, supra, at 229.  The term res gestae possesses an alternate meaning in the law—the 
circumstances surrounding or closely related to a relevant event.  See, e.g., Proprietors of Charles 
River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 469 (1837).  However, for purposes of 
this Article, the term is employed solely to describe such aforementioned hearsay exceptions. 
 17.  The Federal Rules of Evidence do not formally recognize res gestae as an exception to the 
rule against hearsay; rather, based on specific principles, the Rules allow enumerated hearsay 
exceptions, some of which were encompassed within the original res gestae exceptions.  See, e.g., 
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803:2 (2012) (“Under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence reference to the common law concept of res gestae is improper and should be 
avoided.”).  
 18.  See, e.g., Travellers’ Ins. Co. of Chicago v. Mosley, 75 U.S. 397, 408 (1869); Colin Miller, 
A Shock to the System: Analyzing the Conflict Among Courts Over Whether and When Excited 
Utterances May Follow Subsequent Startling Occurrences in Rape and Sexual Assault Cases, 12 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 49, 54 (2005) (“Courts allowed these statements to be admitted 
despite the rule against hearsay because they believed that the statements constituted ‘the automatic 
and undersigned incidents of the particular act in issue. . . .” (quoting Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425, 
427 (Ariz. 1937))).  In Mosley, the Court instructed that: 
 
In the complexity of human affairs, what is done and what is said are often so related that 
neither can be detached without leaving the residue fragmentary and distroted [sic].  
There may be fraud and falsehood as to both; but there is no ground of objection to one 
that does not exist equally as to the other. . . .  The tendency of recent adjudications is to 
extend rather than to narrow, the scope of the [res gestae] doctrine.  Rightly guarded in its 
practical application, there is no principle in the law of evidence more safe in its results.  
There is none which rests on a more solied [sic] basis of reason and authority. 
 
Mosley, 75 U.S. at 408. 
 19.  See supra note 17. 
 20.  Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, verbal acts are no longer considered hearsay and 
thus are admissible on their own without the need to employ a hearsay exception.  FED. R. EVID. 801 
advisory committee’s note.  
 21.  See James Donald Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res 
Gestae Reliability, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 203, 203–04 (1995).  Although championed by Thayer and 
Morgan, Wigmore abhorred the present sense impression as unreliable, as did the organized bar.  
See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot Live in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 907, 911–12 (2001) (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of the Memory Factor 
in Analyzing the Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt—and Quickly Forgotten, 
41 U. FLA. L. REV. 215, 231 & nn.145–47 (1989)).  Congress eventually sided with Thayer and 
Morgan—at least for purposes of even including the exception within the Federal Rules of Evidence 
 
722 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
statements were uttered while the act was occurring, and thus English 
courts required contemporaneity for the statements to be admissible.  
However, early American legal commentators such as Professor John 
Henry Wigmore—“who is generally credited with first articulating the 
excited utterance exception”22—derided the contemporaneity 
requirement of the present sense impression, instead championing the 
excited utterance and its perceived reliability based on the alleged 
accuracy and truthfulness of statements uttered while still under the 
stress of an exciting event despite even a significant time lapse between 
event and statement.23  Once American jurisprudence began fully 
evolving (and prodded by Wigmore’s influential analysis), “precise 
                                                          
—and enacted the present sense impression as the first enumerated exception in Rule 803.  Id. at 
912.  Originally, statements made during an exciting event were the only ones admissible as the 
exception commonly referred to as a “spontaneous declaration.”  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 
& n.8 (1992).  The first recorded case of this hybrid of the present sense impression/excited 
utterance was in the 1694 English case of Thompson v. Trevanion, where the court admitted the 
hearsay statement because it was made before the declarant “had time to devise or contrive any thing 
[sic] for her own advantage.”  (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 179, 179 (K.B.).  English courts continued to 
favor the exception, reasoning that these of type statements “shew [the declarant’s] credit and the 
accuracy of her recollection.”  Regina v. Megson, (1840) 173 Eng. Rep. 894, 895 (K.B.).  It was 
Wigmore who drew the exception away from contemporaneity and toward stress caused by the 
exciting event; Thayer and Morgan preferred contemporaneity while cautioning against the risks of 
stress-induced statements made after an event.  McFarland, supra, at 908–09.  Wigmore won the 
battle, and ever since the excited utterance has inhabited much higher placement than the present 
sense impression.  Id. at 909. 
 22.  Jeffrey S. Siegel, Timing Isn’t Everything: Massachusetts’ Expansion of the Excited 
Utterance Exception in Severe Criminal Cases, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1241, 1250 (1999) (citing Orenstein, 
supra note 15, at 169). 
 23.  6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1750 (James H. 
Chadbourn ed., 1976).  Wigmore stated that: 
 
[T]he statements need not be strictly contemporaneous with the exciting cause; they may 
be subsequent to it, provided there has not been time for the exciting influence to lose its 
sway and to be dissipated.  [It is a] fallacy, formerly entertained by a few courts, that the 
utterance must be strictly contemporaneous . . . .  [T]here can be no definite and fixed 
limit of time.  Each case must depend upon its own circumstances. 
 
Id.  Thus, “Wigmore famously stalled judicial acceptance of the [present sense impression] 
exception for decades,” in favor of the excited utterance exception.  Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, 
Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 336–37 
(2012) (citing EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 342 (1962); 6 WIGMORE, 
supra, at § 1757; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression 
Hearsay Exception: A Relapse in Hearsay Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. 319, 327–28 (2009) (“By and large, 
the courts found Wigmore’s position persuasive. Until the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, only a few jurisdictions recognized the present sense impression.”)); see also State v. 
Carpenter, 773 S.W.2d 1, 9 n.3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (“The present sense impression exception, 
although embraced by the Federal Rules of Evidence, has been criticized by authorities as having 
virtually no indicium of reliability.”), aff’d, 126 S.W.3d 879 (Tenn. 2004). 
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contemporaneousness was not required”24 and the focus became the 
circumstances under which the statement was uttered.25  Therefore, what 
we now call the present sense impression—a narrow hearsay exception 
that requires near strict contemporaneity—receded in favor of the excited 
utterance, a broader hearsay exception that does not require 
contemporaneity.26  Many able commentators have written extensively 
on the other res gestae exceptions, especially the present sense 
impression;27 this Article focuses exclusively on the excited utterance 
exception.28 
                                                          
 24.  See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 15, at 171, 173 (“Wigmore’s insistence on the 
abandonment of any contemporaneousness requirement fashioned the current doctrine.”); Siegel, 
supra note 22, at 1242 (“Over the course of two centuries, the excited utterance doctrine has evolved 
from the concept of res gestae, requiring simultaneity between the underlying event and the 
descriptive statement, to virtually abandoning a temporal requirement between the event and the 
statement.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1171, 1178–79 (2002) (“This exception is based on the idea that if the declarant is speaking 
while still under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event or condition, she presumably has 
not had the opportunity to concoct a false account.”). 
 26.  Modern courts have taken Wigmore’s admonition to heart, concluding that statements 
made several hours—or even several days—after a startling event may nonetheless be admissible 
under the excited utterance exception.  See, e.g., State v. Young, 756 S.E.2d 768, 786 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2014) (statements made six days after startling event admissible as excited utterances); In re C.C., 
Nos. 88320, 88321, 2007 WL 1366431, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2007) (statements made 27 
days after startling event admissible as excited utterances); Apolinar v. Texas, 155 S.W.3d 184, 190–
91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (statements made four days after startling event admissible as excited 
utterances); State v. Duke, No. 52604, 1988 WL 88862, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1988) 
(statements made 10 days after startling event admissible as excited utterances); State v. Padilla, 329 
N.W.2d 263, 267 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (statements made three days after startling event admissible 
as excited utterances). 
 27.  See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 23; Teree E. Foster, Present Sense Impressions: An Analysis 
and a Proposal, 10 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 299 (1979); McFarland, supra note 21; Moorehead, supra note 
21; Liesa L. Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!: E-Hearsay, the Present Sense Impression, and the 
Case for Caution in the Rulemaking Process, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1657 (2012); John R. Waltz, The 
Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA 
L. REV. 869 (1981); Kathryn E. Wohlsen, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Hearsay 
Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), 81 DICK. L. REV. 347 (1977).   
 28.  See infra Part III.A. (explaining the excited utterance exception in comparison with the 
present sense impression). 
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B. A Brief History of the Excited Utterance29 Exception 
Mary stands on a street corner facing east.  She hears a terrible crash 
from the west followed by a man shouting, “Oh, my God!  That truck 
just plowed into the minivan!”  Mary turns west and sees two mangled 
vehicles intertwined amidst smoke and fire.  Years later at the trial of the 
tort claim brought by survivors of the minivan alleging negligence 
against the truck driver and his employer, the plaintiff calls Mary to the 
stand, who testifies she did not see what caused the crash but that she 
heard a man—an unidentified bystander30—shout that the truck caused 
the crash.  The defense attorney does not even object to this hearsay 
testimony because she knows the rules of evidence allow Mary to 
recount for the jury the “excited utterance” made by the unidentified 
bystander,31 whether or not the bystander is available to testify at trial,32 
                                                          
 29.  Wigmore and other early commentators employed the term “spontaneous exclamation” 
rather than “excited utterance.”  Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the 
Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 432 & nn.2–3 (1928).  In the 1920s, Yale Law School 
Dean Robert M. Hutchins—together with psychologist Donald Slesinger—wrote a series of 
influential law review articles regarding evidence law, one of which noted that “spontaneous 
exclamations” are not “an act of pure free will, stimulated by nothing, created out of the air” but 
rather represent “an act so dominated by considerations external to the self, that rational thought or 
personal will plays no part.”  Id. at 432 n.2. 
 30.  The Federal Rules of Evidence classify hearsay exceptions into two groups: those 
admissible only when the declarant is unavailable to testify, FED. R. EVID. 804, and those admissible 
regardless whether the declarant is available to testify, FED. R. EVID. 803.  Based, at least in part, on 
Wigmore’s faith in the reliability of excited utterances, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
included it as one of the hearsay exceptions admissible even if the declarant is available to testify.  In 
essence, “to accept Wigmore’s position, one must be convinced that the declarant’s excited 
statement is more trustworthy than her live recollection of the event at trial.”  Moorehead, supra note 
21, at 239. 
 31.  Research reveals that an inordinate number of early excited utterance cases involved 
railroads/trains and horse-drawn carriages/wagons.  See Orenstein, supra note 15, at 197.  Today, 
civil cases involving an excited utterance run the gamut, with the most frequent type being 
automobile accident cases.  In criminal cases, the bulk of excited utterance incidents come in the 
form of a statement identifying the perpetrator.  The author reached these conclusions after 
researching hundreds of cases on Westlaw.  Prior to the modern era, to be admissible an excited 
utterance could not be in response to questioning; the statement had to originate solely from the 
declarant’s reaction to the startling event: “Where no questions have been asked, the courts are 
willing to concede that physical shock to the declarant is likely to produce the truth if the utterance 
comes before time to misrepresent has been afforded him.”  Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 29, at 
433–34.  However, “[a]lthough dying in agony, if, in response to an inquiry as to the identity of his 
assailant, the declarant says that the defendant shot him, the statement must be excluded.”  Id. at 433.  
Also, prior to the modern era, only declarants involved in the startling event were considered eligible 
for the excited utterance exception; statements made by a casual bystander (such as the unidentified 
bystander in our truck vs. minivan example) were not considered admissible as excited utterances 
because such statements were “by no means so reliable” as those made by persons actually subjected 
to harm or potential harm.  Id. at 434.  In the modern era, however, excited utterances made in 
response to questioning—even police questioning—may be admissible under the exception.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Martin, 59 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1995) (simply because declarant’s 
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because although hearsay, the statement is admissible under the excited 
utterance exception to the rule against hearsay.33 
The anonymous bystander’s statement ascribing fault to the truck 
driver is presumed accurate based on “assumptions about certain human 
behaviors thought to connote truthfulness.”34  According to psychologists 
and behavioral experts, historically, a statement’s reliability could be 
inferred from the statement’s spontaneity, society believing that “[w]hen 
someone speaks impulsively and reflexively about an event that has just 
occurred, he or she is thought unlikely to have either the time or presence 
of mind to fabricate the information.”35  As long as the event was 
exciting enough to cause shock that in turn resulted in the declarant 
falling into an emotional state, a statement uttered while still under the 
stress of that emotion that is “so clearly connected (with the occasion) 
that the declaration may be said to be the spontaneous explanation of the 
real cause”36 is admissible as an excited utterance.  In general, “the 
theory is that the individual is so consumed by the stress of the startling 
occurrence that she is unable to act to promote her own self-interest.”37 
                                                          
“statements responded to a question does not render them inadmissible”); United States v. Lim, 984 
F.2d 331, 336 (9th Cir. 1993) (“statements of Apostol immediately following his arrest were 
admissible as excited utterances under FED. R. EVID. 803(2)”).  Also, statements made by casual 
bystanders may be admissible as excited utterances.  FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note 
(“Participation by the declarant is not required: a nonparticipant may be moved to describe what he 
perceives, and one may be startled by an event in which he is not an actor.”).  The excited utterance 
exception clearly has broadened and expanded over time, something that perhaps would have made 
Wigmore grin. 
 32.  All of the hearsay exceptions contained within FED. R. EVID. 803 apply regardless of the 
availability of the declarant to testify at trial.  Therefore, even if the bystander is later identified and 
available to testify at trial regarding what she observed, her excited utterance is still admissible, even 
if the bystander takes the stand and recants.  However, if the bystander never testifies, the jury has 
no opportunity to assess her demeanor, and the cross-examining attorney cannot question her 
regarding whether she witnessed the entire event, had been drinking alcohol or otherwise did 
anything to impair her perception, knows any of the parties or possesses a reason to be bias, was 
simply joking, has ever been convicted of a felony or a crime involving false statement, or any other 
question that probes the reliability of the declarant’s statement alleging fault; thus are the dangers of 
admitting hearsay where the declarant never testifies—no cross-examination to ferret out credibility, 
accuracy, or truth. 
 33.  FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 34.  Lucy S. McGough, Hearing and Believing Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 485, 486 
(1999); see also Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 29, at 436 (“The desire to lie requires time and 
reflection to develop.  And the intervention of reflection may be avoided by giving it no time to 
occur, thus rendering lying difficult, if not impossible.”). 
 35.  McGough, supra note 34, at 486. 
 36.  Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 29, at 432 (quoting Leahy v. Cass Ave. & Fair-Ground. 
Ry. Co., 10 S.W. 58, 60 (Mo. 1888)); see also 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803(2)[05] (Joseph M. McLaughlin & Mathew Bender eds., 
1997) (“If the subject matter of the statement is such that it would likely be evoked by the event, the 
statement is typically admitted.”). 
 37.  Miller, supra note 18, at 56–57. 
726 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
Professor Wigmore extolled the reliability of a statement uttered 
during or immediately after an exciting event because “in the stress of 
nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the 
utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of one’s 
actual impressions and belief.”38  Such statements, Wigmore argued, are 
presumed credible because they represent “an immediate perception 
unhampered by the potential blurrings and fadings of memory,”39 “the 
contemporaneous nature of the remarks provides insufficient time for 
fabrication[, and] the declarant uttered hearsay while in the throes of 
excitement caused by having witnessed a startling event.”40  Wigmore’s 
criteria for the reliability, and thus admissibility, of such hearsay 
statements were, in substance, adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
Wigmore’s (1) “exciting occasion”41 followed by, (2) “a statement or 
exclamation”42 immediately after the occasion that, (3) relates to “the 
circumstances of the . . . exciting occasion”43 became the Federal Rules 
of Evidence’s “statement relating to a startling event or condition, made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”44 
                                                          
 38.  6 WIGMORE, supra  note 23, at § 1747.  Wigmore explained more fully that:  
 
under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement 
may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the 
utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual 
sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock.  Since this utterance 
is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the 
brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear 
by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken to be particularly trustworthy . . . . 
 
Id.  Wigmore excerpts a handful of early cases from both England and America wherein courts 
admitted into evidence “spontaneous exclamations” because they met certain reliability criteria or 
excluded them because they failed to do so; however, no case cited by Wigmore questions the 
legitimacy of the excited utterance exception.  Id.  The earliest champion of the spontaneous 
statement, Wigmore “isolated and promoted” the excited utterance as an admissible hearsay 
exception, and the exception’s place in modern American jurisprudence is a direct result of 
Wigmore’s efforts.  Orenstein, supra note 15, at 169 (citing 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE § 803(2)[01][D]). 
 39.  Stanley A. Goldman, Distorted Vision: Spontaneous Exclamations as a “Firmly Rooted” 
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453, 458 (1990) (citing 6 WIGMORE, supra 
note 23, at §§ 1705(b)). 
 40.  Id. (citing Foster, supra note 27, at 317–18; BROUN ET AL., supra note 16, at § 297; 6 
WIGMORE, supra note 23, at §§ 1747, 1949). 
 41.  6 WIGMORE, supra note 23, at § 1746. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  FED. R. EVID. 803(2).  The Supreme Court of the United States formally accepted the 
excited utterance as a hearsay exception in White v. Illinois.  502 U.S. 346, 352–57 (1992).  Most 
state evidentiary codes employ identical—or substantially similar—language to that of FED. R. EVID. 
803(2) when defining an admissible excited utterance.  Id. at 355 n.8. 
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Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, both federal 
and state case law generally held that an excited utterance may be 
admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay.45  Wigmore and 
other early commentators cite hundreds of cases from the 1700s through 
the early 1900s wherein courts ruled hearsay statements admissible based 
on their spontaneity after an exciting event and often lauded the quality 
and reliability of such statements.46  Subsequent to the enactment of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, many states adopted evidence codes 
substantially similar to the Federal Rules,47 while other states simply rely 
on established case law in ruling admissible an excited utterance.48  As of 
2014, more than four-fifths of all the states, to varying degrees, recognize 
the excited utterance as an admissible hearsay exception under certain 
circumstances.49 
Supporters of the excited utterance exception50 believe the 
anonymous bystander’s statement is cloaked in reliability51 because the 
                                                          
 45.  See, e.g., 6 WIGMORE, supra note 23, at § 1747. 
 46.  E.g., id.  Wigmore discussed an 1834 manslaughter case wherein a horse-drawn cabriolet 
ran over a pedestrian and the pedestrian then uttered to a bystander—who testified at trial to the 
pedestrian’s statement—that the driver of the cabriolet caused the injury: “It was the best possible 
testimony that under the circumstances can be adduced to show what it was that had knocked the 
deceased down.”  Id. (quoting Rex v. Foster, (1834) 172 Eng. Rep. 1261 (K.B.)).  Wigmore also 
discussed a railroad accident case, explaining: “The statement of Leverett was made immediately 
after he was run over. . . .  It was an emanation of the act in question and so connected with the cause 
of his injuries as to preclude any idea that it was the product of calculated policy.”  Id. (quoting 
Little Rock R.R. Co. v. Leverett, 3 S.W. 50, 53 (Ark. 1886)).  
47  See, e.g., CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, EHRHARDT’S FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 102.1 (2014 ed.), 
available at Westlaw (last updated June 2014) (Florida’s “Evidence Code is patterned after the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  Many of its provisions are identical to the Federal Rules”).  
 48.  See, e.g., Brief for the State of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
15–16, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (No. 90-6113) (listing state statutes). 
 49.  White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8 (asserting that as of 1992, four-fifths of all states recognize the 
excited utterance exception).  The author’s research reveals that this remains true as of 2014. 
 50.  See, e.g., Mason Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 271, 280 (1952) (noting 
that statements uttered under the influence of the stress of an exciting event create an inference the 
declarant is speaking sincerely); McFarland, supra note 21, at 916; Roger C. Park, Visions of 
Applying the Scientific Method to the Hearsay Rule, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (2003) 
(“excited utterances . . . are likely to be more accurate than many other types of hearsay.”).  
McFarland provides that: 
 
The witness perceives an event; the witness blurts out a statement concerning the event.  
Conceivably, a clever prevaricator can have a previously prepared cadre of falsehoods to 
utter while an event is taking place, but that possibility is small to the point of 
nonexistence.  A witness suddenly or unexpectedly confronted with an event is almost 
certain to blurt out a truthful [statement] about that event. 
 
McFarland, supra note 21, at 916. 
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bystander had no time to fabricate, no reason to fabricate, and no time to 
reflect and analyze what just happened such that the bystander then utters 
a mere impression, summary, or conclusion of his belief about what 
happened rather than just blurting out exactly what he saw.52  Put simply, 
supporters believe exciting circumstances result in the truth being uttered 
when the statement occurs soon after an exciting event.53  Critics of the 
excited utterance exception argue,54 based on psychological and 
empirical evidence55—as well as on good old-fashioned common 
sense56—that evidence law should be “awakened from its dogmatic 
slumber”57 and an alternative analysis should be crafted to determine 
whether hearsay statements such as those made by the anonymous 
bystander are sufficiently reliable to admit into evidence and be relied 
upon by the jury. 
III.   APPLICATION OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION 
From the 1700s to the 1970s, the excited utterance exception 
appears, for the most part, to have functioned as designed: admitting 
certain hearsay statements containing at least some indicia of reliability 
that might assist jurors in appropriately deciding a case.58  Whether 
                                                          
 51.  The Supreme Court ruled that an excited utterance may be admitted into evidence when it 
“is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reliability.”  White, 502 
U.S. at 357. 
 52.  McCormick wrote that, “the ultimate question is whether the statement was the result of 
reflective thought or whether it was rather a spontaneous reaction to the exciting event.”  KENNETH 
S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 272 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
 53.  The Latin phrase in vino veritas—in wine there is the truth—is another example of similar 
folk wisdom asserting that, under certain circumstances, people simply do not lie.  In Vino Veritas, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in%20vino%20veritas (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2015).  Analogizing the number of inaccuracies, misstatements, and blatant lies told 
when a declarant is under the influence of alcohol to statements made under excited utterance 
conditions may lead one to conclude that excited utterances are not as reliable as Wigmore argued. 
 54.  See, e.g., Angela Conti & Brian Gitnik, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2): Problems with 
the Excited Utterance Exception to the Rule on Hearsay, 14 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 227, 
228 (1999) (citing Orenstein, supra note 15, at 161; Moorehead, supra note 21, at 203) (“[C]ritics 
take every opportunity to attempt to limit its application or abolish the rule completely.”). 
 55.  See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the psychological aspects of excited utterances). 
 56.  In his concurring opinion in United States v. Boyce, Judge Posner quoted Hutchins and 
Slesinger: “One need not be a psychologist to distrust an observation made under emotional stress; 
everybody accepts such statements with mental reservation.”  742 F.3d 792, 801 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Posner, J., concurring) (quoting Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 29, at 437), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 2321 (2014).   
 57.  Id. (Posner, J., concurring). 
 58.  Perhaps it’s simply a belief that, in the past, people were not as devious and calculating as 
they appear to be today—whether a child threatens his parent that he will call the Department of 
Children and Family Services to claim abuse if he does not get his way, or one spouse murders the 
other spouse in an elaborate plot premised on the surviving spouse’s ability to lie effectively to the 
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employing the exact language of the Federal Rules of Evidence or the 
substantially similar language of most states’ evidence codes, in general 
the excited utterance exception requires three things: (1) a startling event 
causing stress; (2) a statement made while the declarant is still under that 
stress; and, (3) that the statement relate to the startling event.59  As 
simple as those three requirements may seem, different jurisdictions 
interpret the requirements in disparate manners, leading to divergent 
judicial opinions whether a particular statement is admissible.60  Since 
                                                          
police while making exculpatory excited utterances—but a review of hundreds of cases from the 
1700s to the 1960s reveals that courts simply trusted alleged excited utterances more so in the past 
than today, not because rules, codes, or case law mandated such, but based on the perceived 
reliability of such type statements.  See, e.g., Pfeifers of Ark. v. Rorex, 286 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Ark. 1956) 
(in negligence case against department store for fall suffered by patron allegedly due to slippery 
floor, statement immediately after incident that the floor should have been cleaned admitted as a 
spontaneous declaration); State v. Gilbreath, 267 S.W. 880, 882 (Mo. 1924) (statement to her mother 
by teen that her 23-year-old cousin attempted to rape her uttered within minutes of incident 
admissible as a spontaneous declaration).  However, courts one hundred years ago were not naïve; 
just as today, past courts were wary of self-serving statements disguised as excited utterances.  See, 
e.g., Hedlund v. Minneapolis State Ry. Co., 139 N.W. 603, 605 (Minn. 1913) (in trolley car accident, 
statement by trolley car motorman that automobile driver was at fault admitted as a spontaneous 
declaration because it most likely was a fabrication).  The court in Hedlund explained that the 
spontaneous declaration: 
 
had a tendency to show that the motorman was not only excited, but immediately charged 
plaintiff with running into the [trolley] car, a charge that no evidence supported.  It served 
to indicate a desire to throw the entire blame for the accident upon plaintiff, and to clear 
the motorman.  Not unlike evidence that a person accused of [a] crime has attempted to 
accuse others of its commission, the statement has a bearing and is relevant on the 
question of the speaker’s guilt.  In addition to this, the violent and unjustifiably profane 
and indecent nature of the remark tended to show that the motorman was not in the calm 
state of mind that his testimony was apparently intended to show he was in when he 
discovered the emergency that existed. 
 
Id. at 605.  In essence, the Minnesota Supreme Court appears to have admitted the motorman’s 
statement as an excited utterance when today it most likely would be considered an 
admission/opposing party’s statement.  Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(2).  In modern times, so 
powerful and/or damning is an admission that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not even consider an 
admission as hearsay, instead allowing that—even though by definition it should be considered 
hearsay—it nonetheless does not qualify as such under the Rules and therefore is admissible without 
the need to locate an exception under which to admit it.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).  Consider how 
compelling, then, the excited utterance was to courts a hundred years or more ago: rather than 
allowing into evidence an opposing party’s statement as an admission, the court instead admitted it 
as an excited utterance.  
 59.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (“A statement relating to a startling event or condition, 
made while the declarant was under the stress of the excitement that it caused.”). 
 60.  For example, some federal circuits employ different approaches.  See Matthew D. Janssen, 
The Butler Did It!!!: A Critical Analysis of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule as 
Applied in the Third Circuit, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1117, 1124–29 (2002) (discussing different tests for 
analyzing alleged excited utterances).  Janseen explains that the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits 
employ a “three element” approach (i.e., (1) did a startling even occur; (2) was a statement made 
while under stress caused by the event; (3) does the statement relate to the event), the Eighth Circuit 
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the 1980s, however, a steady drumbeat has sounded, building on earlier, 
if sporadic, criticism of the excited utterance61 and repeating calls to re-
examine the exception with any eye toward revising it—or scrapping it 
altogether.62 
A.   Why the Excited Utterance Exception Works, Sometimes 
At first glance, the excited utterance exception makes perfect sense.  
The author was recently driving to the law school to teach Evidence and 
narrowly avoided hitting a motorcycle and SUV involved in a fatal 
intersection crash.  Moments later, standing on the side of the road as 
emergency personnel loaded injured persons into ambulances, the author 
made a statement to the police and could not have lied even had the 
author desired to do so.  The shock of nearly becoming part of an 
accident involving a fatality—coupled with observing emergency 
medical technicians administering aid to the injured driver and 
passenger—certainly results in many declarants’ inability to fabricate.63  
To most people, the credibility of the author’s excited utterance to the 
police regarding the cause of the crash might be considered unassailable. 
Over the centuries that the excited utterance exception has been in 
existence, thousands of cases have been decided involving the 
                                                          
uses a “multi-factor” test exploring six relevant factors (i.e., (1) the time lapse between event and 
statement; (2) whether the statement is in response to an inquiry; (3) declarant’s age; (4) declarant’s 
mental and physical condition; (5) characteristics of the event; (6) statement’s subject matter), the 
Fourth Circuit has a “two element” approach (i.e., (1) declarant must experience a startling event; (2) 
declarant reacts from stress caused by the event and not from reflective thought), and the Sixth 
Circuit employs a different “three element” test than the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit’s (i.e., (1) 
a startling event; (2) declarant makes statement before time to fabricate; (3) statement made under 
stress caused by event).  Id.  Similarly, the author’s research revealed that states approach their 
excited utterance exceptions in a varied manner. 
 61.  See, e.g., Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 29, at 440 (“Thus it appears that the 
spontaneous declarations regarded with least favor by the courts are more trustworthy than those 
which most of them admit without question: those where the trial judge rules that the statement was 
made under the influence of severe physical shock”).  Hutchins and Slesinger assert: “The rule might 
very well read: [h]earsay is inadmissible, especially . . . if it be a spontaneous exclamation.”  Id. at 
439. 
 62.  See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 39, at 456, 463 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88–89 
(1970)) (stating that “many spontaneous exclamations are not made under sufficiently reliable 
circumstances [and] therefore they should not be classified as a firmly rooted hearsay exception” and 
that “the spontaneous exclamation exception fails to comply with the trustworthiness factors”); 
Moorehead, supra note 21, at 203 (arguing that the res gestae exceptions—including the excited 
utterance—“should be abolished” because they are not sufficiently reliable). 
 63.  The accuracy of excited utterances—considering the stress the declarant is required to be 
under for the exception to apply—is an entirely separate concern.  See infra Part III.B.2.  
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exception.64  It is not difficult to locate cases where the exception appears 
to have been applied appropriately to admit a credible excited utterance65 
or to appropriately deny admission of an alleged excited utterance.66  
                                                          
 64.  The advisory committee notes regarding FED. R. EVID. 803(2) note that the excited 
utterance exception “finds support in cases without number.”  FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory 
committee’s note. 
 65.  A relatively recent example from a federal appellate court is most illustrative of this point.  
In United States v. Robinson, according to excited utterances by the defendant’s wife made at the 
scene to police officers, defendant Robinson rammed his wife’s vehicle with his own, fired two shots 
into his wife’s vehicle, and then threatened to kill his wife if she informed the police.  430 F. App’x 
761, 763 (11th Cir. 2011).  Three witnesses (Robinson’s mistress, her mother, and her nephew) 
alleged that they were in the vehicle with Robinson, that none of what the wife told police was 
accurate, and that Robinson committed no crimes.  Id. at 764.  Robinson was later arrested but the 
wife recanted her previous statements to police, refused to testify, and avoided trial subpoena.  Id. at 
763, 765.  After hearing evidence that domestic violence victims often recant their allegations 
subsequent to later contact with their alleged abusers, the district court admitted the wife’s 
statements to police as excited utterances.  Id. at 765–66.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning 
that because the other witnesses had all committed perjury (their testimony did not correspond to the 
evidence), the district court correctly credited the officers’ testimony regarding the wife’s excited 
utterances.  Id. at 767.  The court wrote: 
 
[The wife’s] original statements to law enforcement were reliable, while her later 
recantation was likely the product of duress and fear. . . .  [T]he district court correctly 
observed that [the wife’s] hearsay statements were admissible as excited utterances under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2).  [The wife] made the statements to the officers 
immediately after, and while still under the stress of, the startling confrontation with 
Defendant Robinson. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  Based on physical evidence corroborating the excited utterances (i.e., 
a smashed bumper and paint chips from Robinson’s vehicle found at the scene, along with the bullet 
holes in the wife’s vehicle), it appears the district court correctly concluded that the excited 
utterances were accurate and the other witnesses’ testimony inaccurate/fabricated.  Id.  Without 
admission of the wife’s excited utterances, however, the charges against Robinson could not have 
been proven based on the physical evidence alone.  Id. at 766–67.  This case appears to be one where 
excited utterances were necessary to produce the “correct” outcome, and without admission of the 
excited utterances the correct outcome would not have been achieved.  Id. at 767.  In the civil 
context, Swift Transportation v. Angulo, is illustrative.  716 F.3d 1127 (8th Cir. 2013).  Plaintiff 
Turner sued Defendant Swift subsequent to a vehicle accident, alleging that a truck owned and 
operated by Swift forced him off the road into a ditch.  Id. at 1130.  Minutes after the accident, while 
lying injured in a ditch and awaiting arrival of emergency personnel, Turner told a bystander that a 
“Swift truck” forced him off the road.  Id. at 1130–31.  While still disoriented one hour later at the 
hospital, Turner repeated his allegation to medical personnel.  Id. at 1131.  Several hours later, while 
lying in a hospital bed in pain, Turner again repeated his allegation.  Id.  Prior to trial, Turner lost 
most of his memory regarding the accident due to traumatic brain injury and thus was unable, at 
trial, to identify the truck that forced him off the road.  Id. at 1132.  The district court nonetheless 
admitted as excited utterances Turner’s hearsay statements to the bystander and medical personnel 
ascribing fault to Swift, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 1136–37.  Without admission of 
Turner’s excited utterances, almost no other evidence that Swift operated the negligent truck existed.  
Id. at 1136–38.  Therefore, it appears the excited utterance, in this case, operated to hold a negligent 
party liable and, without the admission of Turner’s hearsay statements, the outcome likely would 
have been different.  
 66.  In Gonzalez v. City of New York, the plaintiff in a slip and fall case alleged that 
immediately after the “accident, a security guard saw her on the floor, and exclaimed ‘oh my God, 
 
732 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
Thus, courts’ reliance on historical precedent may be well founded.  The 
majority in Boyce stressed that the excited utterance exception is well-
established and that the defendant Boyce did “not ask us to find the 
exception[] utterly invalid.”67  Legal opinions in which the excited 
utterance plays a role frequently recite that the exception is “firmly 
established” or “deeply rooted,”68 rarely questioning the exception in the 
manner that both the majority and concurrence do in Boyce. 
Whether the declarant testifies at trial—or is actually identified at 
all—contributes to courts’ analyses of the admissibility of an excited 
utterance.69  Although “[t]he availability or unavailability of a declarant 
as a witness does not affect the applicability of the exception,”70 the 
advisory committee notes accompanying Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(2) caution that “when [a] declarant is an unidentified bystander, the 
cases indicate hesitancy in upholding the statement alone as sufficient.”71  
                                                          
someone else fell.’”  109 A.D.3d 510, 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).  The trial court admitted the 
security guard’s statement as an excited utterance, and the jury found for the plaintiff.  Id.  The 
appellate court reversed, ruling that admission of the statement as an excited utterance was error: 
“the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that ‘at the time of the statement the declarant was under 
the stress of excitement caused by an external event sufficient to still [his] [sic] reflective faculties 
and had no opportunity for deliberation.’  Here, the plaintiff failed to meet that burden.”  Id. at 512 
(quoting Tyrrell v. Wal-Mart Stores, 762 N.E.2d 921, 922 (N.Y. 2001)) (citing Laguesse v. 
Storytown U.S.A., 745 N.Y.S.2d 323, 325–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Berzon v. D’Agostino 
Supermarkets, Inc., 792 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Rodney v. Brookhaven, 644 
N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)). 
 67.  United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 796–97 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2321 (2014).  From this language, one might infer that the majority perhaps may 
have considered the Defendant’s motion to rule the excited utterance no longer a valid exception to 
the rule against hearsay, had the Defendant made such a motion. 
 68.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in White v. Illinois makes clear that the United States 
Supreme Court considers the excited utterance exception “firmly rooted” because it carries 
“sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the Confrontation 
Clause.”  502 U.S. 346, 345 n.8 (1992) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 820–21 (1990); 
Bourgaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182–84 (1987)).  Rehnquist goes on to note that the 
excited utterance “is at least two centuries old and may date to the late seventeenth century.”  Id. 
(internal citations omitted).  Thus the Supreme Court, as most other courts, appears simply to believe 
that courts have always done it this way—most likely for a good reason—so we’re just going to keep 
doing it this way.  That rationalization is exactly what Judge Posner criticizes in his Boyce 
concurrence: “the exception for excited utterances rests on no firmer ground than judicial habit, in 
turn reflecting judicial incuriosity and reluctance to reconsider ancient dogmas.”  Boyce, 742 F.3d at 
802 (Posner, J., concurring).  
 69.  E.g., Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 510 (3d Cir. 1985) (reversing district court’s 
admission of alleged excited utterances made by unidentified declarant, reasoning that “the 
unidentifiability of the declarant is germane to the admissibility determination”). 
 70.  Bornstad ex rel. Estate of Bornstad v. Honey Brook Twp., No. C.A.03-CV-3822, 2005 WL 
2212359, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2005) (citing United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 
2001)), aff’d, 211 F. App’x 118 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 71.  FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note; see also Brown, 254 F.3d at 461.  The court 
in Brown wrote that: 
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In general, therefore, courts scrutinize more closely an alleged excited 
utterance made by an unidentified declarant, but such statements are not 
“ipso facto inadmissible under FED. R. EVID. 803(2).”72 
In some cases, the excited utterance may accompany its sister 
exception—the present sense impression73—as occurs in Boyce.  But, 
whereas the present sense impression requires that the statement come 
during or immediately after the event and that it be one “describing or 
explaining” the event, the excited utterance is a much broader exception, 
allowing statements that are merely “relating” to the event that may be 
uttered immediately after—or even weeks after—the event.74  Neither 
                                                          
Brown also argues that in admitting the two [unidentified] men’s statements, the District 
Court ran afoul of our holding in Miller.  We do not agree.  Although we did state in 
Miller that a party seeking to introduce a statement by an unidentified declarant under 
Rule 803(2) “carries a burden heavier than where the declarant is identified to 
demonstrate the statement’s circumstantial trustworthiness,” we also emphasized that 
“such statements are admissible if they otherwise meet the criteria of[Rule] [sic] 803(2).”  
For the reasons set forth supra, Officer Hughes’s testimony satisfies all the criteria of that 
rule . . . .  [T]he declarants did in fact claim to have personally seen the startling event: a 
man wielding a gun.  Moreover, the declarants are simply stating what they observed.  
They are not giving an opinion, which is what occurs when a declarant points a finger of 
fault for causing an accident. . . .  Furthermore, even if we did interpret the “heavier 
burden” for unidentified declarants, established in Miller, to require corroboration of the 
startling event beyond the excited utterance itself, the fact that Officer Hughes almost 
immediately came upon Brown, who was visibly carrying a gun and who was identified 
as the gun brandisher by the two declarants, provides such corroboration.  
 
Id. (quoting Miller, 754 F.2d at 510) (citing United States v. Collins, 60 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
 72.  Miller, 754 F.2d at 510. 
 73.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(1).  Admissibility under the present sense impression exception, 
however, is more rare than under the excited utterance exception, and cases involving it “are far less 
numerous.”  FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note; see also supra note 4 (discussing the 
contrast between the number of cases involving each exception).  Commentators have noted that 
“[u]ntil the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, only a few jurisdictions recognized the 
present sense impression exception.”  Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 327 (citing 2 GEORGE E. DIX 
ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 271 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006)). 
 74.  FED. R. EVID. 803(1), (2).  As discussed earlier, the excited utterance exception may allow 
for admission of statements made hours—or even days—after the event; the present sense 
impression is limited to concurrent statements or those made within a few moments of the event.  
See supra note 26.  Considering the advent and availability of the cellular/smart phone over the past 
decade, the present sense impression may be aptly demonstrated by the following scenario: a woman 
walking down a dark alley while talking on her cell phone to her sister as she narrates: “There is a 
tall, bald man wearing a leather coat following me.  He has a dragon tattoo on his cheek and six hoop 
earrings in his left earlobe.  Now he’s chasing me!”  The phone goes dead.  At the murder trial of the 
tall, bald, dragon-tattooed defendant with six hoop earrings, the sister testifies to the victim’s 
description of the man and events under the present sense impression exception.  Juxtapose that 
scenario with the victim surviving the attack and minutes later calling her sister back and exclaiming 
into the phone: “Send the police and an ambulance here now!  A tall, bald man with a dragon tattoo 
on his cheek and six hoop earrings just attacked me and I need help now!”  Under this alternative 
scenario, the declarant’s statements most likely would be admitted at trial pursuant to the excited 
utterance exception.  
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exception requires corroboration,75 but only the excited utterance may 
come in response to questioning.76  Courts continue to favor the excited 
utterance over the present sense impression,77 if only out of judicial 
habit, but greater numbers of legal commentators are now attacking both 
exceptions, with increased criticism of the excited utterance due to its 
inherent flaws caused by psychological concerns.78 
B.   But Does the Excited Utterance Exception Really Work? 
Despite the excited utterance’s potential attributes and its past 
contributions to the jury’s function of divining the truth to render a just 
verdict, two severe concerns underlie the exception: (1) the fabricating 
declarant; and, (2) the impaired or inaccurate declarant.  Some 
commentators favor admitting all hearsay and then simply allowing the 
                                                          
 75.  Pursuant to the language of each rule, neither FED. R. EVID. 803(1) nor 803(2) requires 
corroboration for the exception to apply; however, with the present sense impression, corroboration 
was assumed—at least prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules—because: 
 
the statement is contemporaneous with the event, it is made at the place of the event.  
Consequently the event is open to perception by the senses of the persons to whom the 
declaration is made and by whom it is usually reported on the witness stand.  The witness 
is subject to cross-examination concerning the event as well as the fact and content of the 
utterance, so that the extra-judicial does not depend solely upon the credit of the 
declarant. 
 
Morgan, supra note 16, at 236.  However, subsequent to the enactment of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, although “courts sometimes focus on the corroboration or the lack thereof in admitting or 
excluding present sense impressions, [] the truth is that the rule does not condition admissibility on 
the availability of corroboration.”  United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal 
citations omitted).  For the proposition that excited utterances require no corroboration, see United 
States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2321 (2014) (“corroboration is not required for admissibility”); State v. Cox, No. 99 BA 46, 2001 
WL 301429, at *2 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2001) (“The admission of an excited utterance does 
not require corroboration or independent proof . . . .”). 
 76.  See United States v. Frost, 684 F.3d 963, 974 (10th Cir. 2012) (regarding declarant’s 
excited utterances in response to a police officer’s inquiry: “even if prompted by questioning, a 
statement may be admissible if the questions are somewhat open-ended” (citing United States v. 
Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1055 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming admission of excited utterances in response 
to police officer’s questioning that was not “suggestive”))); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 
81, 86 (8th Cir. 1980) (statements in response to police officer’s question “what happened?” 
admitted as excited utterances); see also United States v. Jennings, 496 F.3d 344, 347, 350 (4th Cir. 
2007) (victim’s statements in response to bystander’s question “what’s wrong?” admitted as excited 
utterances). 
 77.  Some commentators have written that the present sense impression “has not proved as 
useful as anticipated.”  CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
8:67 (3d ed. 2007), available at Westlaw (last updated May 2014). 
 78.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
2015] ABOLISHING THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION 735 
jury to assess the statement’s reliability;79  however, the adage “you can’t 
un-ring a bell” may persuade others that the trial judge should maintain 
the gatekeeper function of admitting only relevant, at least somewhat 
reliable, evidence, while the jury fulfills its duty to examine that 
evidence uninfluenced by having heard a statement that never should 
have been admitted because it simply had no indicia of reliability—
because, if the jury hears it, the jury will consider the statement, either 
consciously or subconsciously, in its deliberations, regardless whether 
the judge issues a curative instruction.80  The excited utterance exception, 
however, may allow into evidence statements that are flat-out lies, or 
statements that are no more reliable than ones mumbled during a night’s 
sleep. 
1.   Fabrication 
In People v. Simpson, the complainant alleged that Simpson 
threatened her with a box-cutter, pushed her into an alley, robbed her, 
and then sexually assaulted her.81  The complainant further alleged that 
Simpson then tried to force the complainant up to her apartment—to 
steal more from her and perhaps sexually assault her again—but with the 
help of two friends passing by, the complainant escaped from Simpson 
and then momentarily assisted her friends in chasing Simpson.82  Five 
minutes after the incident—while her friends were still chasing 
Simpson—the complainant called the police from her apartment and 
reported (on a recorded 911 call) that her attacker had a gun and a knife, 
even though Simpson never possessed a gun.83  At Simpson’s trial, the 
complainant testified that she consciously lied about the defendant 
possessing a gun because, “I knew that if I said there was a gun, that the 
                                                          
 79.  See, e.g., Michael L. Siegel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence 
Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 915 (1992) (“Twelve jurors are at least as capable of weighing 
hearsay as a single judge.”); Tribe, supra note 14, at 957 (the English system has “seen fit to 
virtually abandon the hearsay rule in civil cases” (citing the Civil Evidence Act, 1968, c. 64, pt. 1, § 
2(1) (U.K.))). 
 80.  Situations involving a curative instruction so frustrated the author when trying cases.  No 
matter how the judge phrased the curative instruction, the belief persisted that jurors perked up their 
ears and reviewed in their minds even more diligently the statement the judge told them to disregard: 
It was as if the jury members thought to themselves, “if the judge told me to ignore, it must have 
been important, or at least juicy.”  It is like putting a box on a high shelf and telling a child he is not 
to look in the box; the first thing the child does when the parent turns her back is start climbing the 
shelves.  Curative instructions are certainly necessary, but the legal system should do it all it can to 
limit the instances in which they are employed. 
 81.  656 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 767. 
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cops would come quicker.”84  Over Simpson’s objection, the trial court 
admitted the complainant’s hearsay statements on the 911 recording as 
excited utterances.85  Simpson was convicted, and he filed an appeal.86  
The appellate court affirmed the conviction and the trial court’s 
admission of the complainant’s recorded 911 statements because the 
excited nature of the statements subsequent to such a horrifying event 
“overcomes the significance of her admitted lie to the police about the 
gun.”87 
Many argue that admission of statements such as those made by the 
complainant in Simpson is exactly what is wrong with the excited 
utterance exception: even though circumstances appear to demonstrate 
the declarant still remains under the stress of an exciting event—who 
would ever dispute that, five minutes after someone is robbed and raped 
at knife-point and is about to be robbed and perhaps raped again, she is 
still under the stress of the incident—the declarant clearly had the mental 
and reflective acumen to fabricate a lie designed to accomplish the arrest 
of her assailant.  In Simpson, the dissenting justice reasoned that, “the 
complainant had the cognitive ability to purposely lie to the 911 operator 
that the defendant possessed a gun in an effort to prompt a more 
immediate police response demonstrates that she was acting ‘under the 
impetus of studied reflection,’” and obviously she was not still under the 
stress of the event such that she did not have time to reflect or fabricate 
because she did indeed fabricate and with calculated reason to do so.88  
                                                          
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id.  The appellate court noted that “the complainant’s presence on the witness stand 
provided an additional justification for admission . . . since the defendant had the opportunity to 
verify and test the trustworthiness of her statements by cross-examination.”  Id. at 767–68 (citing 
People v. Buie, 658 N.E.2d 192, 198–99 (N.Y. 1995)).  Similar to Simpson, in State v. Magers, the 
Washington Supreme Court affirmed admission of an excited utterance even though the declarant 
lied to police in a portion of the statement.  189 P.3d 126, 134 (Wash. 2008) (“We agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the fact that [the declarant] told the police a falsehood when she denied [the 
Defendant’s] presence in her house does not mean that the remainder of her statements were not 
spontaneous and truthful.”). 
 88.  Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (Joy, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Edwards, 392 N.E.2d 
1229, 1231 (N.Y. 1979)).  Employing the majority’s reasoning in Simpson, a Washington appellate 
court affirmed admission of a victim’s inculpatory statements to police in a domestic violence case 
despite the victim’s fabrication that the defendant’s appearance at victim’s home surprised her.  State 
v. Al-Derawi, No. 61115-1-I, 2009 WL 1410714, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. May 18, 2009).  Telephone 
records confirmed that the victim had in fact called the defendant that day and was aware he was 
coming to the home.  Id. at *4.  The court reasoned that, since the police officer’s testimony 
regarding the victim’s statements did not specifically recount the victim’s lie, there was no 
fabricated testimony heard by the jury.  Id. at *5.  This reasoning appears flawed: even though the 
victim lied to police, her inculpatory hearsay statements were admissible as excited utterances 
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Based on the complainant’s friends’ testimony and the presence of the 
complainant’s jewelry and a box-cutter in Simpson’s possession,89 it 
appears that the complainant was telling the truth about the entire 
incident; however, one can easily envision a scenario where a wily 
declarant could employ the excited utterance as a means to perpetrate a 
fraud on the court in an effort to manipulate an unjust outcome or escape 
prosecution.90 
Dating back to its earliest beginnings, “the Anglo-American law of 
Evidence has been obsessed with the prevention of perjury” and this 
concern “had a major influence on the formulation of the hearsay rule.”91  
However, English courts believed that certain hearsay exceptions “did 
not pose significant risks of perjury” and therefore unanimously accepted 
the excited utterance as a valid exception because the surrounding 
circumstances were thought to indicate the declarant was “speaking 
sincerely.”92  Nothing about these early cases and early judicial 
                                                          
because the jury never heard the victim’s lie.  See id.  Whether the jury heard the lie isn’t the point.  
The excited utterance exception is only valid if the statement is reliable because it fits within the 
requirements of the exception.  If the declarant fabricated any part of the statement, by definition 
aren’t the requirements of the exception not met?  
 89.  Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 766. 
 90.  For anyone who has seen the Julia Roberts film Sleeping with the Enemy, the final scene 
may come to mind, wherein Laura holds a gun on her abusive husband while she dials 911.  
SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY (Twentieth Century Fox 1991).  The husband taunts her, threatening 
that he’ll never let her go and that if he can’t have her no one will.  Id.  Laura gasps into the phone 
what could only later be described as an excited utterance: “Come quickly!  I’ve just killed an 
intruder!”  Id.  Then, Laura calmly and deliberately fires three shots, murdering her abusive husband.  
Id. 
 91.  Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 319, 321 (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst 
Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the Logical Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 1069 (1992)).  Imwinkelried comprehensively traced the English courts’ early efforts to root 
out perjury and analyzed why there was so much concern—i.e., an incentive for criminals to commit 
perjury under the Crown Witness system, a bounty paid by the government for successful 
prosecution of thieves, and such severe and abundant fraud in the civil realm that Parliament enacted 
the first Statute of Frauds.  Id. at 320–21.  Imwinkelried notes that “at early common law interested 
persons were incompetent as witnesses” because they had a reason/motive to fabricate.  Id. at 321.  
Ultimately, Imwinkelried concluded that the English “concern about perjury had a profound 
influence in shaping the common law of Evidence.”  Id.; see also McFarland, supra note 21, at 916 
(that a declarant might have lied “is probably the danger of most concern for any hearsay 
statement”). 
 92.  Id.; see also 2 DIX ET AL., supra note 73, at § 272.  However, the original excited utterance 
exception admitted only spontaneous statements that were not in response to questioning because, 
“[a]s a result of interpolation of the question, what would otherwise be admissible becomes ‘not the 
natural and spontaneous outgrowth of [the event], but a mere narrative of a past transaction, and 
hence not a part of the res gestae.’”  Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 29, at 433 (quoting People v. 
Westcott, 260 P. 901, 905 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927)); see also supra note 31.  To this day courts 
fear fabrication: the majority in United States v. Boyce notes that “answering questions rather than 
giving a spontaneous narration could increase the chances that the statements were made with 
calculated narration, and, as we discussed, [the declarant] ran to another residence between the 
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formulations centered on accuracy; it was all about perjury, and the stress 
of an exciting event was thought to defeat the ability to lie.93 
Although empirical studies conclude that the risk of fabrication 
decreases “where only a matter of seconds or fractions of seconds 
separate a particular event and an individual’s description of that 
event,”94 even early experiments reveal that, for some declarants, it takes 
less than one second to fabricate a lie.95  Modern studies confirm these 
early results and further show that “the truth took longer to [utter] than a 
previously conceived lie, and that even a lie fabricated on the spur of the 
moment required less than three seconds to create and utter.”96  As Judge 
Posner notes in his Boyce concurrence, “[m]ost lies in fact are 
spontaneous,”97 leading to the conclusion that some lies may attend the 
aftermath of an exciting event in the form of an excited utterance.  Many 
parents know the experience of dashing into the kitchen after hearing the 
crash of broken plates only to ask the question “What happened?” and 
hear one’s four-year-old exclaim in response, “It wasn’t me; it was my 
brother!”98  Some may argue that it is simply a natural human reaction to 
blame another for an exciting event rather than accept fault for the event 
oneself; such a fabricated assignment of blame often may take the form 
of an excited utterance. 
Unique to the excited utterance exception is that no independent 
corroboration need exist to prove that a startling event occurred: the 
excited utterance itself may be employed as the sole proof that a startling 
event even happened.99  Therefore, unlike other hearsay exceptions, the 
                                                          
battery and her 911 call.”  742 F.3d 792, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2321 
(2014). 
 93.  See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 29, at 437 (“In order more fully to guard against 
deceit, a good deal of reliance is placed on shock, and the emotion generated thereby, provided it is 
severe enough to still the reflective faculties.  There is every reason to suppose that such an emotion 
would render difficult a consciously planned lie.”). 
 94.  Goldman, supra note 39, at 460 (citing Foster, supra note 27, at 315). 
 95.  Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 29, at 436–37 (citing Herbert Sidney Langfield, 
Psychophysical Symptoms of Deception, 15 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 319, 319–328 (1920–1921); 
William M. Marston, Reaction-Time Symptoms of Deception, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 72, 72–
87 (1920)).  
 96.  McFarland, supra note 21, at 917. 
 97.  Boyce, 742 F.3d at 800 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 98.  See McGough, supra note 34, at 488 (in a series of experiments regarding children and 
fabrication, psychologists concluded that preschoolers told lies to protect their mothers even when 
the children were not instructed by their mothers or the experimenters what to say or how to act, and 
“most children inferred guilt from the mother’s actions and intuitively lied to protect her”).  
 99.  FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (although rarely is some other type evidence 
of the existence of the exciting event not available to corroborate its occurrence, “the only evidence 
[of the exciting event] may be the content of the statement itself” (citing Armour & Co. v. Indus. 
Comm’n, 243 P. 546, 547 (Colo. 1926); Young v. Stewart, 131 S.E. 735, 738 (N.C. 1926))).  For the 
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excited utterance exception allows for complete fabrication of not only 
the hearsay statement admitted as an excited utterance, but also of the 
circumstances that prove a startling event even occurred (thus fulfilling 
the first requirement—“a startling event”—of the excited utterance 
exception).  Such is the ultimate example of “boot-strapping.” 
The author imagines a man who legally owns a handgun convicted of 
felony assault for allegedly threatening his ex-girlfriend with his firearm 
under the following facts: a frantic declarant telephones the police and 
shouts that her ex-boyfriend is holding a gun on her and is threatening to 
shoot her unless she takes him back; the police arrive at the declarant’s 
apartment and she provides a description of her ex-boyfriend, who is 
arrested a few blocks away as he walks down the sidewalk; police find a 
loaded handgun in his possession; at trial, the declarant refuses to testify, 
and the only evidence presented by the prosecutor is the declarant’s 
recorded 911 call (admitted as an excited utterance) and testimony from 
the police regarding the declarant’s condition, her description of the ex-
boyfriend, and details of the ex-boyfriend’s arrest.  Although the 
prosecutor asserts that she is not required by the excited utterance 
exception to produce any corroboration of the exciting event other than 
the declarant’s statement, she argues that possession of the handgun by 
the defendant when the police arrested him constitutes corroboration of 
the exciting event (and of the declarant’s statement) if the court asks for 
such.  The defendant certainly could be convicted on these facts, 
especially if the prosecutor explains to the jury that domestic violence 
victims often refuse to testify against their abusers.  However, the 
                                                          
general proposition that the excited utterance itself may suffice as the sole proof of the startling 
event, see, for example, United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 459 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he generally 
prevailing rule [is] that an excited utterance may of itself be sufficient to establish the occurrence of 
the startling event. . . .  Most jurisdictions also find the statement in itself sufficient.” (citing United 
States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1986))).  Courts in more recent cases appear hesitant to 
admit statements when the only evidence of the startling event is the statement itself; courts tend to 
discuss the lack of a requirement of corroboration but ultimately conclude that—when the statement 
is ruled admissible—circumstantial evidence of the exciting event did in fact exist.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 202–03 (6th Cir. 2007) (Moore J., dissenting) (arguing that the only 
evidence of the defendant threatening the declarant with a gun was the statement itself, while the 
majority concludes that the victim’s detailed description of a gun later found in defendant’s 
possession—along with the defendant’s demeanor—provided circumstantial evidence of the startling 
event).  However, some courts deny admission of alleged excited utterances without corroboration of 
the startling event but employ the legal reasoning that nothing in the declarant’s statement evinced 
sufficient personal knowledge required under FED. R. EVID. 602.  See, e.g., Gainer v. Wal-Mart 
Stores E., L.P., 933 F. Supp. 2d 920, 931–32 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (citing Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 
507 (3d Cir.1985)); Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(declarant “was admittedly not present at the alleged event and therefore has no personal knowledge 
of when it ended.  Her assertion is thus inadmissible under FRE 602”).  
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declarant could have fabricated the entire incident,100 her knowledge and 
description of the defendant’s handgun coming solely from the period in 
which they were still together when she presumably could have seen it, 
held it, or even fired it herself.101  Maybe the old adage “bad facts make 
bad law” reverberates powerfully in this example, but it does appear that 
the excited utterance exception—especially considering its lack of a 
requirement of corroboration of the exciting event—could be 
manipulated via fabrication by some, or many, would-be declarants.102 
                                                          
 100.  See, e.g., Friedman & McCormack, supra note 25, at 1181.  Friedman and McCormack 
state that:  
 
a call to 911 is likely to lead to a criminal trial (absent a guilty plea), and [] at trial the 
prosecutor will seek to use the caller’s initial statements as evidence, often without the 
caller testifying in court. . . .  The result is that 911 callers are effectively allowed to 
testify without exposing themselves to the oath or to cross-examination.  Not 
surprisingly, some callers abuse the opportunity. 
 
Id. 
 101.  Felon-in-possession cases are especially vulnerable to fabricated excited utterances: all the 
declarant need do is telephone the police and exclaim that the defendant brandished a gun.  
Regardless whether the defendant ever did brandish a firearm and with no corroboration of the event 
other than the excited utterance, as long as the defendant is later found in possession of a firearm the 
arrest and conviction of the defendant is likely assured.  See, e.g., United States v. Ballew, 491 F. 
App’x 589, 591 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming the proper admission of “he’s got a gun” based on “the 
911 call, the woman’s demeanor, the discovery of a firearm nearby, and the short time frame”); 
United States v. Holmes, 498 F. App’x 923, 925 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming that 911 calls were 
admissible as excited utterances); United States v. Boyd, 237 F. App’x 892 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(“statements during the 911 call were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule”); Hadley v. United States, Nos. 1:02-CR-147, 1:10-CV-36, 2013 WL 365260, at *1–2 (E.D. 
Tenn. Jan. 30, 2013) (declarant’s statements made during 911 call and when police arrived 
admissible).  In fact, the case that prompted Judge Posner’s critique of the excited utterance 
exception, and thus prompted this Article, is a felon-in-possession case premised on admission of an 
excited utterance.  Boyce, 742 F.3d 792. 
 102.  See, e.g., United States v. DeMarce, 564 F.3d 989, 996 (8th Cir. 2009) (victim’s statements 
to mother inadmissible as excited utterances because victim initially lied to mother); State v. Hansen, 
986 P.2d 346, 349 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (declarant’s “anger with [defendant] could have provided a 
motivation to fabricate or exaggerate in her description of the events to Officer Nickerson” and 
therefore statements were inadmissible as excited utterances); People v. Lawler, 568 N.E.2d 895, 
900–01 (Ill. 1991) (“[I]t is clear that the alleged abduction of the complainant was an event that 
would qualify as ‘sufficiently startling.’  However, by the complainant’s own admission, she 
fabricated much of the conversation with her father” and therefore her alleged excited utterances 
ruled inadmissible); People v. Simon, 953 N.E.2d 1, 24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (declarant-defendant 
possessed motive to fabricate alleged excited utterance exculpating himself); State v. Brown, 903 
P.2d 459, 463 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (because declarant “decided to lie to the police about being 
abducted prior to making the 911 call, the call cannot constitute an excited utterance”); Friedman & 
McCormack, supra note 25, at 1180 (“if the witness seems sufficiently traumatized by the event, the 
court may be willing to admit a statement that admittedly includes a self-interested lie”).  Of course, 
the true fear is not all the cases that can be found regarding when a court determined the declarant 
was lying and thus denied admission of the alleged excited utterance; rather, the true fear is those 
instances where no court caught the declarant’s lie, where a criminal defendant now languishes in 
prison unjustly, where a civil litigant loses a case when rightfully she should have prevailed, or 
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2.   Inaccuracy 
Almost from the birth of the excited utterance exception, 
psychologists and legal commentators have criticized the notion of 
assigning reliability to statements uttered by participants or observers 
after a startling event.103  After reviewing early psychological 
experiments regarding the accuracy of statements made while the 
declarant labored under emotional stress, Dean Hutchins and Dr. 
Slesinger opined that, “[o]n psychological grounds, the rule might very 
well read: Hearsay is inadmissible, especially (not except) if it be a 
spontaneous exclamation.”104  In essence, for the excited utterance 
exception to operate as Wigmore envisioned it, a declarant need be so 
upset by an event that she cannot lie about it but not so upset that she is 
inaccurate in her description of the event.  Imagine the infrequency of 
scenarios wherein this balancing is actually accomplished. 
Therefore, after potential fabrication, the first threat to the credibility 
of an excited utterance comes from the possibility that the startling event 
has so unnerved the declarant that her statement is not reliable because it 
has been negatively affected by the stress from which she is still 
suffering.105  Psychological researchers investigating the effects of stress 
                                                          
where a jury acquits a murderer based on admission into evidence as an excited utterance a 
fabricated exculpatory statement. 
 103.  See, e.g., Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 29, at 437 (“One need not be a psychologist to 
distrust an observation made under emotional stress,” and citing various psychological studies from 
1893 through 1927); 2 GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 272 (Kenneth S. Broun 
ed., 7th ed. 2013) (“While psychologists would probably concede that excitement minimizes the 
possibility of reflective self-interest influencing the [excited utterance] declarant’s statements, they 
have questioned whether this might be outweighed by the distorting effect of shock and excitement 
upon the declarant’s observation and judgment.”); Orenstein, supra note 15, at 180 (“For decades, 
scholars have attacked the wisdom of fashioning an exception to the hearsay rule that depends upon 
the excited and stressful state of the speaker.”).  Psychologists have long criticized the accuracy of 
excited utterances.  See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 39, at 62 (“After considerable study, authorities 
in the field have found that the accuracy of an individual’s perception of an event may vary widely 
as a result of an infinite number of potential variables.” (citing I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, 
Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 
1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 21 (1970))); Moorehead, supra note 21, at 232 (“judicial applications of the 
exception often appear to overlook the possibility that a traumatic event may not only still reflective 
thought, but may also hinder rational thought and cognitive functioning”).  
 104.  Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 29, at 439.  They further concluded that “the spontaneous 
declarations regarded with least favor by the courts are more trustworthy than those which most of 
them admit without question: those where the trial judge rules that the statement was made under the 
influence of severe physical shock.”  Id. at 440; see also Goldman, supra note 39, at 462 (“the more 
startling the event, and the greater the emotional reaction, the less likely the declarant’s observation 
will be accurate”). 
 105.  See Moorehead, supra note 21, at 238–39 (internal citations omitted); see also Goldman, 
supra note 39, at 459–60 (“[I]t is virtually impossible to ascertain whether the utterance is generated 
by the episode observed or by operation of the declarant’s mental processes, even where the 
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on perception and memory have concluded that stress—such as a 
“startling event” sufficient to satisfy the first requirement of the excited 
utterance exception—had a negative effect on the accuracy of the 
declarants such that they accomplished a correct identification only 42% 
of the time.106  People react differently to stress, but, in general, stressful 
situations result in the brain releasing more cortisol, and researchers have 
concluded that increased cortisol levels accompanied by increased heart 
rate result in both a more defensive reaction and inhibited cognitive 
functionality.107  Given that cortisol levels typically peak anywhere from 
twenty to forty minutes subsequent to the onset of stress and cortisol 
impedes memory and recall,108 if courts are admitting excited utterances 
made twenty minutes or more after the event, those statements likely lack 
accuracy and detail, based purely on elevated cortisol levels. 
Whether delving into the psychobiologic processes that affect a 
declarant’s perception and memory of a startling event, or simply 
approaching it from a layman’s perspective,109 one can, at a minimum, 
acknowledge that excited utterances may not be as accurate as statements 
                                                          
declaration is emitted virtually instantaneously upon cognizance of the event.  Yet it is the speed 
which usually forms the crux of the spontaneity requirement.” (quoting, Foster, supra note 27, at 
325–26)).  Moorehead wrote that:  
 
Indeed, stressful events are responsible for problems of perception, cognition, and 
performance at a variety of levels and in virtually every situation—from a decline in 
major league batting averages in pressure situations, to the ability of police officers to 
perform adequately in high-stress training, to the way in which students cope with exam 
pressure. 
 
Moorehead, supra note 21, at 238–39 (internal citations omitted).  Regarding the obsession with 
potential perjury versus dismissal of any concerns of inaccuracy/misperception based on stress, 
Orenstein asserted: “the excited utterance doctrine’s emphasis on sincerity obfuscates the much more 
pressing issue of perception and memory.  It reflects the disproportionate concern that evidence law 
evinces for deliberate falsification, as compared with honest error produced by the normal operation 
of cognitive processes.”  Orenstein, supra note 15, at 179.  
 106.  Brian H. Bornstein & Timothy R. Robicheaux, Methodological Issues in the Study of 
Eyewitness Memory and Arousal, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 525, 539 (2009) (basing conclusion on 34 
published papers regarding experiments involving over 3,600 participants). 
 107.  See generally Tony W. Buchanan, Daniel Tranel & Ralph Adolphs, Impaired Memory 
Retrieval Correlates with Individual Differences in Cortisol Response But Not Autonomic Response, 
13 LEARNING & MEMORY 382 (2006). 
 108.  Margaret E. Kemeny, The Psychobiology of Stress, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 124, 126 (2003). 
 109.  Judge Posner wrote, regarding the present sense impression (but such observation is clearly 
analogous to the excited utterance), that the exception entered American jurisprudence “long before 
there was a field of cognitive psychology; it has neither a theoretical nor an empirical basis; and it’s 
not even common sense—it’s not even good folk psychology.”  United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 
792, 801 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring) (citing Waltz, supra note 27, at 871), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2321 (2014). 
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uttered regarding non-stressful events, and, at the extreme, recognize the 
potential for the severe inaccuracy of an excited utterance.110  Though, in 
some people, stress or arousal can increase accuracy and detail regarding 
certain perceived information,111 how is a court to know whether the 
declarant is such a person?  The psychological literature certainly 
appears to conclude that, for the majority of individuals, perception and 
memory are negatively affected by stress such as that caused by a 
startling event sufficient to meet the threshold requirement of the excited 
utterance exception.112 
The second threat to the accuracy of an excited utterance comes from 
the physical or medical condition of the declarant.  The excited utterance 
exception—whether as defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
states’ evidence codes, or the states’ common law recognition of the 
exception—requires no analysis of the perceptive qualities and accuracy 
of the declarant.113  Not discussing, or not analyzing, accuracy is not 
error under the Rules, nor is accuracy a pre-requisite for admissibility,114 
and this Article does not seek to assign blame to any court for not 
conducting such an analysis.  Case after case exists, however, where it 
appears there is reason to doubt the accuracy of a declarant’s excited 
utterance, and in such cases the court typically performs no analysis of 
the declarant’s ability to perceive and appreciate the details contained in 
the statement.115 
                                                          
 110.  See Orenstein, supra note 15, at 181 (“Besides the distracting excitement itself, there may 
be strong personal feelings evoked by the startling event that affect memory and perception.” (citing 
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 47–51 
(1987))).  Orenstein discusses studies regarding the accuracy of perceptions/memories of persons 
experiencing natural disasters and studies concluding that “the more violent and emotion-provoking 
the crime, the less well it will be remembered.”  Id. at 181 n.79 (citing LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra, at 
32, 51). 
 111.  Id. at 182 (citing Howard Egeth, Emotion and the Eyewitness, in THE HEART’S EYE: 
EMOTIONAL INFLUENCES IN PERCEPTION AND ATTENTION 257, 258 (Paula M. Neidenthal & 
Shinobu Kitayama eds., 1994)). 
 112.  For a more complete analysis of the psychological arguments both for and against the 
accuracy of excited utterances, see, for example, Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, The Influence of Arousal 
on Reliability of Testimony, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE: RECENT PSYCHOLOGICAL 
RESEARCH AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 235–236 (Sally M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. Clifford eds., 
1983); JAMES MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 16 (1966); Stewart, supra note 103, 
at 21; Egeth, supra note 111.  
 113.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 114.  See id. 
 115.  E.g., State v. Turner, 420 S.W.3d 666, 667–68 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (statements by a 
declarant who was screaming, crying, bleeding from a head wound, suffering from severe burns to 
her skin and vocal chords, and, according to a police officer on the scene, “was near death” admitted 
as excited utterances).  A pop cultural reference that may come to mind to prove the effectiveness of 
cross-examining a witness who otherwise appears to be unbiased, credible, and accurate—as many 
excited utterance declarants do—is the scene in the Oscar-winning film My Cousin Vinny, wherein 
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A recent example is State v. Turner, wherein an excited utterance 
made by a declarant who was screaming, crying, bleeding from a head 
wound, suffering from severe burns to her skin and vocal chords, and, 
according to a police officer on the scene, “was near death,” was ruled 
admissible.116  The declarant had been beaten in the face and head, had 
gasoline poured over her, and had been set on fire.117  Subsequent to the 
excited utterances, the declarant’s blood alcohol content was measured 
by medical personnel as 2.18, which an expert testified could equate to 
someone suffering from something as minor as “slurred speech” or as 
severe as “near coma.”118  The court’s analysis focused only on whether 
the declarant may have had the opportunity for reflective thought such 
that the statements possibly were fabricated; nowhere in the opinion did 
the court analyze the potential inaccuracy of the declarant’s statements 
based on her physical or medical condition.119  As with so many other 
courts’ analyses, the court in Turner discussed only whether there was a 
startling event and whether the declarant still suffered from its effect 
when she made her statements.120 
Although other hearsay exceptions allow for admission of statements 
made by declarants who may be impaired—simply because the language 
of the Rules does not bar such121—only the excited utterance exception is 
premised upon and, by definition, requires some degree of impairment 
                                                          
the defense lawyer cross-examines an elderly witness regarding her eyewitness identification of the 
defendants by demonstrating that the witness’s eyesight is so poor she could not possibly accurately 
identify anyone at the subject distance under the subject circumstances.  MY COUSIN VINNY 
(Twentieth Century Fox 1992). 
 116.  Turner, 420 S.W.3d at 667–68.  For another recent example of a seemingly impaired 
declarant, see People v. Anderson, wherein a declarant who had been beaten with a baseball bat, 
“was bleeding profusely from her head and complaining of dizziness,” and was becoming 
“increasingly agitated,” made statements to the police that were admitted as excited utterances 
without any analysis by the court regarding the potential inaccuracy of the declarant’s statements 
based on her physical or medical condition.  114 A.D.3d 1083, 1085 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).  See 
also State v. Benavidez, No. 33,480, 2013 WL 5970845, at *11 (N.M. Nov. 7, 2013) (excited 
utterances of murder victim made shortly before death admitted despite being shot twice and 
experiencing pain and confusion; court’s analysis focused solely on whether declarant had time “for 
reflection or fabrication”); People v. Bird, No. 2–12–0573, 2013 WL 656827, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Feb. 21, 2013) (statements implicating defendant admitted as excited utterances even though 93-
year-old declarant suffered from dementia and Alzheimer’s disease; court performed no analysis of 
potential effect of declarant’s condition on her reliability/accuracy); Mobley v. Kirkpatrick, 778 F. 
Supp. 2d 291, 308–09 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (excited utterances admitted even though declarant had 
“been severely wounded as result of being shot in the back and arm” and was “experiencing extreme 
pain”).   
 117.  Turner, 420 S.W.3d at 668. 
 118.  Id. at 670. 
 119.  Id. at 669–71. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See FED. R. EVID. 803–04. 
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(assuming that an emotional state caused by the stress of a startling event 
qualifies as impairment).122  Of course, it is possible that any hearsay 
declarant may be impaired, and thus the accuracy of her statement 
potentially compromised; but courts perform an analysis of the 
declarant’s possible impairment, pursuant to Rules 104 and 602, when 
determining whether to admit the hearsay statement under a hearsay 
exception other than under the excited utterance exception.123  Whether 
that impairment emanates from the startling event or from the physical or 
medical condition from which the declarant may be suffering, the 
accuracy of statements alleged to be admissible under the excited 
utterance exception, at a minimum, warrants scrutiny beyond that 
regarding the fear of fabrication.124 
IV.   THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PROBLEM 
Even though properly analyzed and then deemed an admissible 
excited utterance under Rule 803(2) or the corresponding state 
evidentiary rule, in criminal prosecutions the hearsay statement must 
undergo further scrutiny to determine if its admission violates the Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against oneself125 in those 
                                                          
 122.  See FED. R. EVID. 803. 
 123.  See, e.g., United States v. Two Shields, 497 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2007) (denying 
admission of hearsay statement under the statement-against interest, FED. R. EVID. 804 (b)(3), dying 
declaration, FED. R. EVID. 804 (b)(2), and residual catch-all, FED. R. EVID. 807, exceptions because 
declarant “highly intoxicated”); Navarrete v. State, 656 S.E.2d 814, 818 (Ga. 2008) (hearsay 
statement made to medical personnel inadmissible under state’s “necessity exception” because 
declarant was intoxicated), contra, United States v. Water, 413 F.3d 812, 818 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(hearsay statement of intoxicated declarant admissible as excited utterance because “there was 
nothing in his demeanor or the circumstances to indicate he had a motive to lie”). 
 124.  Other hearsay exceptions recognize that possible impairment of the declarant affects the 
accuracy, and thus admissibility, of the statement.  Regarding the dying declaration exception, see, 
for example, Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event: On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1374 (1985) (“[T]he reliability of such evidence is obviously 
overstated.  Pain, catastrophic physical calamity, and anguish may characterize the circumstances 
under which a declarant makes such statements.  Perception, memory, comprehension, and clarity of 
expression are likely to be impaired.”).  Therefore, under other hearsay exceptions, oftentimes courts 
analyze the potential impairment of the hearsay declarant.  See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, No. 
Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 3, 2005) (in murder trial of defendant 
for stabbing victim to death, district court suppressed dying declaration of victim: “The experience 
of pain could affect the trustworthiness or accuracy of the declaration” (citing Dying Declarations, 
46 IOWA L. REV. 356, 376 (1961))).  
 125.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  In one of the first cases to cite the Confrontation Clause, Chief 
Justice John Marshall questioned why the Court should consider admitting any out-of-court 
statement offered against a criminal defendant: “why a man should have a constitutional claim to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in his absence, may be 
evidence against him.”  United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (D. Va. 1807).  Even by the late 
1800s, however, the Supreme Court still did not specifically relate the issue of hearsay with a 
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cases where the declarant does not testify.126  Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s landmark case of Crawford v. Washington revising the standard 
for admissibility of hearsay statements offered against criminal 
defendants pursuant to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, 127 
the prevailing Ohio v. Roberts reliability doctrine128 allowed greater 
latitude for admission of excited utterances and other hearsay 
statements.129  Subsequent to Crawford, however, excited utterances and 
                                                          
criminal defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights; instead, the Court continued to apply the right to 
confront only to the prevention of testimony taken ex parte.  See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 
U.S. 237 (1895) (the word “hearsay” does not even appear in the Mattox opinion).  Supreme Court 
cases from the 1970s refused to extend the Confrontation Clause’s protections to evidentiary 
hearsay.  See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (“[T]his Court has never equated the 
[Confrontation Clause and evidentiary hearsay], and we decline to do so now.” (citing Note, 
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1436 (1966))); California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (although “hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed 
to protect similar values . . . to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause 
is” a mere extension of the evidentiary rules is simply incorrect).  It was only with the advent of 
Ohio v. Roberts, Idaho v. Wright, and White v. Illinois that the Supreme Court generally began to 
equate aspects of the rule against hearsay and its exceptions to the right to confrontation guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment.  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
346 (1992).   
 126.  United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[E]ven if a statement 
qualifies for an exception to the hearsay doctrine—based upon judicially fashioned reliability 
principles—the statement’s admission may violate the Sixth Amendment’s mandate for 
‘confrontation’ if it constitutes ‘testimonial’ hearsay.” (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–62)). 
 127.  541 U.S. at 53–54 (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause bars 
“admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was 
unavailable to testify and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination”). 
 128.  See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (holding that, to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, an 
inculpatory hearsay statement by an unavailable declarant offered against a criminal defendant is 
admissible if it either bears “adequate ‘indicia of reliability’” or falls into a “firmly rooted hearsay 
exception”); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007) (“With respect to testimonial out-of-
court statements, Crawford is more restrictive than was Roberts, and this may improve the accuracy 
of factfinding in some criminal cases.  Specifically, under Roberts, there may have been cases in 
which courts erroneously determined that testimonial statements were reliable.”). 
 129.  Allegations that a criminal defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights have been violated 
typically involve hearsay statements sought to be admitted as excited utterances (or, perhaps, dying 
declarations).  This is because the right to confront is satisfied if the declarant testifies at trial and is 
cross-examinable; for the most part, crime victims who are non-testifying hearsay declarants are 
excited utterers and dying declarers, not other types of hearsay exception declarants.  Rare is the 
criminal case where a hearsay exception other than the excited utterance or dying declaration is the 
hearsay exception involved in a question whether the defendant’s constitutional right to confront 
witnesses was satisfied.  However, some courts have erroneously failed to perform a Crawford 
analysis if the hearsay statement is offered as an excited utterance: “the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has expressly held that Crawford has no application where the trial court admits hearsay testimony 
pursuant to the excited utterance exception.”  Wright v. Klopotoski, No. 09–2093, 2010 WL 
4321536, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010).  Other courts have performed a Crawford analysis when 
one is not appropriate.  See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 26 A.3d 248, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (when 
criminal defendant seeks to admit exculpatory excited utterance, error for state court to deny 
admission based on a finding the statement is testimonial under Crawford; the Confrontation Clause 
applies only when the government seeks to admit hearsay statements by an unavailable declarant).   
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other hearsay statements made in response to police questioning asked 
with the goal of prosecution—or made to persons other than law 
enforcement but nonetheless with the goal of later prosecution—instead 
of posed simply to assist law enforcement in addressing an ongoing 
emergency, were deemed inadmissible due to their testimonial nature.130  
Crawford’s Supreme Court progeny has further refined the admissibility 
standard of excited utterances and other such hearsay statements that are 
testimonial in nature.131 
A.   Testimonial 
When a hearsay declarant’s statement is made in response to police 
questioning or in furtherance of later prosecution, the Confrontation 
Clause may bar its admission if the court determines the statement was 
testimonial.132  John lies sprawled on the floor; Susan rushes to him and 
                                                          
 130.  In 2007, the Supreme Court confirmed that a criminal defendant’s Confrontation Clause 
rights do not extend to precluding admission of non-testimonial hearsay statements offered against 
him.  Whorton, 549 U.S. at 420 (“Under Crawford . . . the Confrontation Clause has no application 
to [non-testimonial hearsay] statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack 
indicia of reliability.”).   
 131. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (if “the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,” 
then the statements are testimonial in nature and thus inadmissible; however, “[s]tatements are 
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency”); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156, 1162 (2011).  In Bryant, the Court 
instructed that correctly categorizing the statement as testimonial or non-testimonial requires: 
 
[a]n objective analysis of the circumstances of an encounter and the statements and 
actions of the parties to it . . . .  [T]he relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual 
purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that 
reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals’ statements 
and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred. . . .  [The court] 
should determine the “primary purpose of the interrogation” by objectively evaluating the 
statements and actions of the parties to the encounter, in light of the circumstances in 
which the interrogation occurs. 
 
Id. 
 132.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.  The Supreme Court explicitly declined to define “testimonial” in 
Crawford or subsequent cases; there is considerable debate whether “testimonial” equates only to 
statements made to law enforcement collected with the goal of prosecution, or to any hearsay 
statement offered against the criminal defendant, or to something in between.  Jeffrey L. Fisher—
who argued Crawford before the Supreme Court—and other legal scholars have opined that when a 
declarant gives a blow-by-blow account of a completed event to someone in a position of authority, 
the court should categorize the statement as testimonial.  Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—and 
What is Happening—to the Confrontation Clause, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 587, 624 (2007).  Other 
commentators have argued that “testimonial” means hearsay statements “made in anticipation of 
prosecutorial use.”  E.g., Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 
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gasps, “What happened?”  With his dying breath John exclaims, “Matt 
shot me!”  John’s statement incriminating Matt is admissible—via the 
testimony of Susan recounting the incident on the witness stand at Matt’s 
murder trial—either as an excited utterance or a dying declaration, or 
both.  However, if Susan rushes to help John, who then exclaims, “Tell 
the police Matt shot me!”, that hearsay statement may not be admissible 
at Matt’s murder trial because the court might rule it testimonial—that 
John uttered it with the intent of assisting in the prosecution of Matt, to 
serve as a substitute for John’s trial testimony.133 
Similarly, when police question a victim or witness, the 
circumstances control whether the responses are ruled testimonial or 
non-testimonial.  In Franklin v. Curtin, subsequent to witnessing her 
father stab to death her mother and two sisters, the surviving four-year-
old daughter told police at the crime scene—in the presence of her father 
just a few feet away—that her father killed her mother and sisters.134  The 
trial court and state appellate court ruled the statement admissible as an 
excited utterance, but the federal district court held that: 
                                                          
553, 556 (2007).  Professor Friedman argued the companion case to Davis, Hammon v. Indiana, 546 
U.S. 1088 (2006). 
 133.  Most courts have become quite adept at the Crawford analysis, scrutinizing hearsay 
statements in an effort to define them as testimonial or non-testimonial.  See, e.g., People v. 
Castellano, No. 1-08-1709, 2012 WL 6934931, at *5 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012) (victim’s 
statements to police at murder scene admitted as non-testimonial excited utterances because, 
“[v]iewed objectively, the nature of what was asked and answered was such that the elicited 
statements were necessary to be able to resolve an ongoing emergency rather than to simply learn 
what had happened in the past,” but victim’s later statements to police in ambulance in response to 
police question, “again [tell me] what happened,” inadmissible because they were testimonial 
(quoting People v. Sutton, 908 N.E.2d 50, 67 (Ill. 2009))); Best v. United States, 66 A.3d 1013, 1018 
(D.C. 2013) (assault victim’s excited utterances to police implicating defendant made while she was 
still in car ruled non-testimonial but statements made moments later after ambulance called and 
victim sat on curb ruled testimonial).  The full excerpt of Best is as follows: 
 
Police, responding to a 9–1–1 call regarding an assault occurring in a car, found Ms. 
Coleman seated inside, bleeding from her head and face.  One officer described her 
demeanor as “excited, crying, agitated, very emotional, and very, very upset.”  After 
summoning an ambulance, Officer Conway asked what had happened.  Ms. Coleman 
gave a brief, but graphic, description of events. The officer then asked her to step out of 
the car.  She did so, and then sat down on the curb.  Trying to calm her, Officer Conway 
asked for more details, which Ms. Coleman provided.  “We conclude[d] that the initial 
statements, recounting the basic facts of the assault, were non-testimonial because the 
primary purpose of Officer Conway’s questioning was to enable him to respond most 
effectively to an ongoing emergency.”  “However, we conclude[d] that the more detailed 
account that Ms. Coleman provided a short time later, after she had alighted from the car 
and sat down on the curb, was testimonial because at that time the emergency had 
dissipated.” 
 
Best, 66 A.3d at 1018 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 938 A.2d 771, 774, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 134.  No. 07-10548, 2014 WL 1091744, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2014). 
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[h]er response to the officer was not a cry for help, and it did not enable 
police officers to end an immediate threat to them or the public.  A 
reasonable participant would have concluded that the primary purpose 
of the officer’s question was to establish what happened, as opposed to 
ending a present emergency.  The Court therefore believes [declarant’s] 
statement to the police was testimonial, and the admission of her 
statement violated the petitioner’s right of confrontation.135 
Whether Crawford, Davis, Boyce, or the myriad of other excited 
utterance criminal cases invoking the Confrontation Clause, the advent of 
recorded 911 telephone calls made to law enforcement has 
fundamentally changed the manner in which jurors appreciate and 
consider admission of excited utterances.  It is one thing for Officer 
Jones to testify regarding what the victim told him at the scene of the 
home invasion, but an entirely separate matter for the jury to hear the 
victim’s own voice on a recorded 911 call frantically recount what just 
happened to her family and her description of the perpetrators who did it.  
The excited utterance has become all the more powerful since the 
declarant’s own voice can now be heard.136 
This heightened constitutional concern to satisfy the Confrontation 
Clause reserved almost exclusively for the excited utterance exception 
(and, to a lesser extent, the dying declaration exception) makes the 
question of admission of such statements in criminal cases that much 
more critical.  Overwhelmingly, it is the admission of excited utterances 
and not other hearsay exceptions that result in incarceration or execution; 
in general, defendants are not being convicted with hearsay evidence 
admitted under the public records exception, or recorded recollection.137  
                                                          
 135.  Id. at *2–3, *9. 
 136.  For those familiar with the Harrison Ford-Tommy Lee Jones film The Fugitive, the reaction 
of jurors while they listen to the murder victim’s halting but desperate 911 call for help as she lays in 
a pool of her own blood provides an example of how the advent of 911 recordings being played 
during trials has a much greater effect than simple witness accounts of hearsay statements.  THE 
FUGITIVE (Warner Brothers 1993).  [Although real cases are what the law is truly about, rarely do 
we have visual illustrations for the facts in those real cases; all we have is a cold recitation of the 
facts provided in the case law.  Therefore, imagining the scene via known depictions of similar facts 
can assist in understanding the legal points attempted to be made in this Article.  The author 
apologizes for the sporadic film references in this Article but hopes they may assist the reader in 
more fully gleaning the author’s intended arguments.]. 
 137.  See supra note 4; see also United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799–802 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Posner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2321 (2014) (excited utterance on 911 call “was a 
major piece of evidence of the defendant’s guilt”); Friedman & McCormack, supra note 25, at 1178 
(“Although occasionally other doctrines come into play, the so-called ‘excited utterance’ or 
‘spontaneous declaration’ exception to the hearsay rule provides the principal basis on which courts 
allow this type of evidence to bypass the obstacles of the rule against hearsay and the defendant’s 
confrontation right.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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Truly, it is vital that the justice system gets the excited utterance 
exception right. 
B.   Non-Testimonial 
The facts in Boyce provide an illustration just how far the 
Confrontation Clause question has progressed in the ten years since 
Crawford, considering that neither the majority opinion nor Judge 
Posner’s concurrence even mentions Crawford or performs a testimonial 
versus non-testimonial analysis: both simply assumed that the declarant 
Portis’s statements to law enforcement on her 911 telephone call were 
“non-testimonial” and thus not barred by the Confrontation Clause 
pursuant to Crawford.138  The 911 call in Boyce was as follows: 
Sarah Portis called 911 at around 7:45 p.m. on March 27, 2010, asking 
that police come to her residence because her child’s father had just hit 
her and was “going crazy for no reason.”  The 911 operator asked, 
“Any weapons involved?” to which Portis responded, “Yes.”  The 
operator asked what kind, and Portis said, “A gun.”  The operator said, 
“He has a gun?”, then “Hello?”, and Portis responded, “I, I think so. 
‘Cause he just, he just.”  After the operator said, “Come on,” Portis 
responded, “Yes!” twice.  The operator again inquired, “Did you see 
one?” and Portis replied, “Yes!”  The operator then cautioned Portis 
that if she wasn’t telling the truth, she could be taken to jail.  Portis 
responded, “I’m positive.”  After giving a description of what Boyce 
was wearing, the operator asked where he was at the moment.  Portis 
responded that she “just ran upstairs to [her] neighbor’s house” and 
didn’t know whether Boyce had left her house yet.139 
Clearly, the questions the 911 operator140 asked Portis were designed 
to allow the police to meet the ongoing emergency of a possible armed 
assailant loose on the premises or in the neighborhood, and the answers 
Portis gave responded only to those questions without adding any 
potential non-testimonial superfluousness.  Neither the majority nor 
Judge Posner needed to address the Crawford analysis because a decade 
of case law has evolved to indicate under what scenarios testimonial 
versus non-testimonial is even a question.141 
                                                          
 138.  See Boyce, 742 F.3d at 798–802. 
 139.  Id. at 793. 
 140.  Such 911 operators are considered “law enforcement” for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 828–29 (2006).  
 141.  However, some courts appear to be extending the non-testimonial limits by admitting 
excited utterances made to law enforcement that, on their face, appear to be made neither with the 
goal of allowing the police to meet an ongoing emergency nor for any other purpose than later 
prosecution.  See, e.g., Savoie v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, No. 6:20-1735, 2013 WL 1352021, at 
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Under Whorton v. Bockting, non-testimonial statements offered 
against a criminal defendant do not violate the Confrontation Clause and 
thus are not subject to any greater scrutiny or analysis than were they 
offered in a civil case or to exculpate the criminal defendant.142  In 
essence, an excited utterance made to someone other than law 
enforcement may be used to convict a criminal defendant in cases where 
the statement has no guarantee of trustworthiness other than the fact that 
it was uttered subsequent to a startling event while the declarant was still 
under the stress of the startling event.  And, excited utterances made to 
law enforcement that are deemed non-testimonial may be used to convict 
a criminal defendant even when the statement has no guarantee of 
trustworthiness other than that it purportedly fit the definition of an 
excited utterance.  It seems the Drafters’ intent may have been something 
more than simply providing the right to confront in cases where an 
inculpatory excited utterance was made to law enforcement.143  Because 
the excited utterance is by far the most popular exception under which 
inculpatory hearsay statements are offered against criminal defendants, 
shouldn’t we have a stronger guarantee of trustworthiness than an alleged 
startling event that produces some stress? 
V.   THE REMEDIES 
What is this hold the excited utterance exerts on our evidence law?  
Really, it all traces back to one man: Wigmore.144  His insistence on the 
accuracy of a statement made while under stress—despite the fallacy of 
                                                          
*2 (W.D. La. Apr. 2, 2013) (statements by 76-six-year-old declarant made to law enforcement at 
crime scene and in hospital that she was forced to perform oral sex on defendant admitted as excited 
utterances because police officer “served as more of a comforter to the victim than an interrogating 
government officer”); Champ v. Zavaras, 431 F. App’x 641, 650–51 (10th Cir. 2011).  The Champ 
court’s reasoning is as follows: 
 
Officer Christian arrived upon the scene to find the victim bleeding from her neck.  She 
applied pressure to the wound, and it was necessary for her to ride in the ambulance with 
the victim to continue to apply pressure to stop the bleeding.  Although Officer Christian 
remained at the hospital with the victim for about two hours, [the victim] was still 
distressed by the assault and was in a substantial amount of pain from her injuries.  [The 
victim’s] statements were not made in a formal setting such as a police station. . . .  
Accordingly, we hold that where, as here, a victim makes an excited utterance to a police 
officer, in a noncustodial setting and without indicia of formality, the statement is 
nontestimonial interrogation under Crawford. 
 
Champ, 431 F. App’x at 650–51. 
 142.  549 U.S. 406, 419–20 (2007). 
 143.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 144.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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that assertion—is primarily, if not solely, why today we still labor under 
the admissibility of excited utterances.145  Courts are notoriously slow in 
effecting change.  Judge Posner has called for change, along with other 
jurists and commentators,146 but perhaps coming from such a figure as 
Judge Posner the exception can finally be revised, amended, or 
discarded.  Somewhere, is Wigmore smiling at the consternation he has 
wrought; his exception still lives today, in the face of reams of court 
opinions and mountains of psychological evidence undercutting it.  What 
will it take to “reconsider ancient dogmas”147 and allow the excited 
utterance to go gently into that good night? 
A.   Judge Posner’s Recommendation 
In his concurrence in Boyce, Judge Posner wrote of his desire that 
“Rule 807 (‘Residual Exception’) swallow much of Rules 801 through 
806.”148  In essence, Judge Posner suggests that all hearsay statements 
sought to be admitted under an exception to the rule against hearsay be 
analyzed in the same manner as are hearsay statements sought to be 
admitted when—although they fit within no enumerated hearsay 
exception—they evince guarantees of trustworthiness and are most 
probative of the point for which they are offered.149  By definition, Rule 
807 (the “residual exception”) vests in the trial judge tremendous 
discretion—much more discretion than with any other exception150—
                                                          
 145.  See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 146.  United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring) (noting 
that he is “not alone” in criticizing the exception), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2321 (2014). 
 147.  Id. (Posner, J., concurring). 
 148.  Id. at 802 (Posner, J., concurring) (“Trials would go better with a simpler rule, the core of 
which would be the proposition . . . that hearsay evidence should be admissible when it is reliable, 
when the jury can understand its strengths and limitations, and when it will materially enhance the 
likelihood of a correct outcome.”).  Presumably, Judge Posner would allow an individual admission 
under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) to remain admissible as non-hearsay.  However, by including “Rule 801” in 
his sentence, one can only surmise that Judge Posner sought to include declarant witnesses’ prior 
statements under Rule 801(d)(1) and statements by party opponents under Rules 801(d)(2)(B) 
through (E) in his suggested abolition of most enumerated hearsay exceptions in favor of the residual 
exception swallowing them.   
 149.  See id.  Legal commenters have made similar—or exactly the same—recommendations as 
to what Judge Posner proposed.  See, e.g., Moorehead, supra note 21, at 243–46 (proposing the res 
gestae hearsay exceptions—including the excited utterance—be replaced with a residual catch-all); 
Siegel, supra note 79, at 896 (proposing a “Best Evidence Rule” for hearsay statements); Orenstein, 
supra note 15, at 164–65, 216 (proposing revising the excited utterance exception, and proposing a 
new exception for survivors of rape and other sexual violence). 
 150.  See FED. R. EVID. 807.  Under the Rules, judges possess a somewhat high degree of 
discretion in determining whether to admit the testimony of a witness offered as an expert under 
FED. R. EVID. 702, but this discretion is tempered by the parameters of Daubert and its progeny.  
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
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because admission under it requires no hard and fast criteria be met.151  
Seemingly aware of the potential inconsistencies and/or abuses by 
providing such a wide swath of discretion, when debating enactment of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, lawmakers admonished judges to exercise 
extreme caution when deciding whether to admit or reject hearsay 
statements under the residual exception.152 
Criticism of the highly discretionary aspect153 of the residual 
exception154 began almost as soon as the Rules were enacted.155  
                                                          
 151.  See FED. R. EVID. 807.  Rule 807 provides: 
 
 (a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not excluded 
by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay 
exception in Rule 803 or 804:  
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness;  
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;  
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and  
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice. 
 
Id. 
 152.  Moorehead, supra note 21, at 243–44 (citing RICHARD O. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. 
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 502 (2d ed. 1982)) (although the original 
advisory committee notes to the first iteration of the residual exception stated that the exception did 
“not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion,” the advisory committee notes to the 
present Rule 807 contain no such warning); S. REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066.  The Supreme Court concluded that the residual exception was not a 
“firmly rooted” hearsay exception when analyzing Confrontation Clause issues, evincing its 
suspicion of the use of the exception in criminal cases when offered against the accused.  Idaho v. 
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990).  
 153.  See, e.g., Navedo v. Primecare Med., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00888, 2014 WL 1451836, at *2 
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2014) (“The decision to exclude evidence offered under the residual hearsay 
exception of Rule 807 is entrusted to the court’s discretion.” (citing United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 
985, 991 (3d Cir. 1985))). 
 154.  When the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975, they included a variation of the 
residual exception within both Rule 803 and Rule 804; however, in 1997, those two residual 
exceptions—Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) and Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)—were collapsed into the current 
Rule 807.  FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note.  
 155.  See, e.g., 5 CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:139 
(4th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw (last updated May 2014).  Mueller and Kirkpatrick explain that: 
 
The House Judiciary Committee proposed to delete the [residual exception] altogether . . . 
.  The accompanying Committee Report reflected the concern that the catchalls inject ‘too 
much uncertainty into the law of evidence’ and impair ‘the ability of the practitioners to 
prepare for trial . . . .’  Remarks on the floor of the House reiterated the concern to protect 
the ability of practitioners to plan for trial, and there were influential critics of the 
provisions. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  The Senate similarly was concerned with the discretion the residual 
exception bestowed on trial judges, so it proposed—and the House accepted—a notice provision, 
which allowed the residual exception to escape deletion from the Rules.  Id. 
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Practicing lawyers desire certainty, or, at least as much certainty as they 
can negotiate.  When preparing to try a case, or deciding whether to try a 
case or settle/plead, a lawyer wants to know—needs to know—what 
evidence is most likely to be admitted or excluded.156  Definitive rules 
with detailed requirements provide lawyers that certainty.157  The 
residual exception provides no certainty, instead relying on the trial 
judge’s individual interpretation of the loose verbiage of Rule 807’s 
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”158  That 
                                                          
 156.  Even when a lawyer sits in her office after interviewing a potential client calculating 
whether to accept the matter based on her assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case 
and the probability she can admit certain evidence, she needs the certainty of knowing whether 
hearsay statements uttered in the matter will, most likely, be admitted or rejected.  
 157.  See, e.g., Christopher Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of 
Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 397 (1992).  Mueller provides that: 
 
Practitioners strongly believe they need protection against broad judicial discretion.  They 
worry that if judges are freed completely from the constraint of rules by the generality of 
a ‘standard,’ subject only to the immediate pressures of lawyers and trials, the judges are 
very likely to err by favoring one or another lawyer or cause without principled basis, not 
so much because they are venal but because they are human. . . .  Trial judges may need 
rules of some sort to deal wisely with hearsay.  It is one thing for Judge Weinstein, who is 
both a scholar and an extraordinary jurist, to claim judges work better without rules, and 
quite another to suppose most judges can do so.  Rules also invite a second look by 
appellate courts, which probably contributes to the development of sound doctrine and 
corrects some mistakes. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 158.  4 CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:32 (4th ed. 
2009), available at Westlaw (last updated 2014) (stating that the Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright 
noted that the residual exception “invites ad hoc judgments on reliability that do not have behind 
them the experience and tradition of the categorical exceptions.  It is true that the federal [residual 
exception] in Rule 807 is unbounded in the sense that it lacks specific criteria and could conceivably 
apply to any statement” (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990))); see also State v. Htoo, 
No. A13-0935, 2014 WL 1758201, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. May 5, 2014) (reliability of witness 
recounting hearsay declarant’s inculpatory statements offered against criminal defendant is 
“irrelevant under the residual-hearsay-exception analysis”).  As an example of the disparate and 
highly discretionary approach courts take to the residual exception, consider the recent case of 
F.T.C. v. Ross, wherein the Fourth Circuit concluded that hearsay statements thoroughly analyzed by 
the district court under FED. R. EVID. 807 and admitted under the residual exception should not in 
fact have been admitted under the residual exception.  743 F.3d 886, 893 (4th Cir. 2014).  The 
district court had methodically analyzed each of the enumerated requirements in the Rule and 
compared those factors to the circumstances surrounding the hearsay statements, ultimately 
concluding that each of the four elements of the Rule was met.  F.T.C. v. Ross, No. RDB-08-3233, 
2012 WL 4018037 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2012).  The Fifth Circuit, however, held that the statements 
were admissible under the exception for adoptive admissions, not under the residual exception.  See 
United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 74 (5th Cir. 2013) (declining to overrule district court’s 
“discretionary ruling” refusing to admit exculpatory hearsay statements under the residual exception 
because they were potentially misleading or confusing, or would require the admission of more 
evidence for the jury to properly understand them).  Different courts employ vastly different tests 
when determining whether to admit hearsay statements under the residual exception, from the Fifth 
Circuit’s highly restrictive approach to the Ninth Circuit’s looser standard.  Compare Pozen Inc. v. 
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uncertainty may be acceptable in those rare instances where hearsay 
statements are sought to be admitted under the residual exception,159 but 
to lump all questions of hearsay admissibility into the “analysis” of 
various trial judges’ individual discretion instead of the delineated and 
detailed analyses provided by Rules 801 through 806 creates far too 
much uncertainly, such that it may wreak incalculable effects on the 
                                                          
Par Pharm., Inc., 696 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.6 (5th Cir. 2013), with United States v. Fowlie, 24 F.3d 
1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994), and Draper v. Rosario, No. S-10-32 KJM EFB PC, 2014 WL 1664917, 
at *4  (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2014).  The Fifth Circuit in Pozen provided that:  
 
‘The residual hearsay exception is to be used only rarely, in truly exceptional cases.’  To 
admit evidence under the residual hearsay rule, there must be at least circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness.  The Fifth Circuit has found there are equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness when the declaration is made under oath and 
the declarant is subject to the penalties of perjury, the testimony was preserved on 
videotape, and the witnesses were subject to cross-examination.  
 
696 F.3d at 1161 n.6 (quoting United States v. Walker, 410 F.3d 754, 757–58 (5th Cir. 2005)).  In 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Fowlie asserted that: “Hearsay evidence sought to be admitted under 
[the residual] exception must have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the 
listed exceptions to the hearsay rule.”  24 F.3d at 1069 (citing Guam v. Ibanez, 880 F.2d 108, 113 
n.5 (9th Cir. 1989)).  Along the same lines as the Ninth Circuit, the Eastern District of California 
explained that, “a district [court] has the discretion to admit a hearsay statement in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ so long as it meets [Rule 807]’s requirements.”  2014 WL 1664917, at *4 (quoting 
United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 500–01 (9th Cir. 2010)).  There are numerous examples 
wherein it appears the court relied purely on its own discretion in admitting or denying admission of 
hearsay statements under the residual exception.  See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 
233 (3d Cir. 2013) (records of foreign banks admissible under FED. R. EVID. 807 despite not meeting 
the requirements of FED. R. EVID. 803(6), the business records exception under which domestic bank 
records are admitted); Gov’t of V.I. v. Mosby, 512 F. App’x 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2013) (proper to deny 
admission of audio tape under FED. R. EVID. 807 because there was no proof a “hit man” came to the 
Virgin Islands and committed the murder; defendant had offered an exculpatory recording on which 
declarant stated to confidential police informant that drug cartel requested he hire a hit man to 
murder victim in effort to prove defendant did not commit the murder).  Because the residual 
exception is invoked so rarely, some jurisdictions do not even have a reliable body of case law upon 
which to rely in performing their analyses.  E.g., Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, Inc., 727 
F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2013) (“There is a lack of Sixth Circuit case law on the residual exception’s 
trustworthiness requirement outside of the context of the Confrontation Clause. . . .”). 
 159.  4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 158, at § 8:140 (noting that Congress desired the 
residual exception to be “used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.” (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 93-1277, supra note 152, at 7066)); see also United States v. Walker, 410 F.3d 754, 757 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (“The residual hearsay exception ‘is to be used only rarely, in truly exceptional cases.’” 
(quoting United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 419 n.23 (5th Cir. 2000)); United States v. Dunford, 
148 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 1998) (the residual exception “should not be construed broadly.  To 
construe it broadly would easily cause the exception to swallow the rule” (citing United States v. 
Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1368 (4th Cir. 1979), 2 DIX, supra note 73, at § 324)).  From April of 2013 
to April 2014, there were only eight reported cases from the twelve U.S. courts of appeal involving 
the question of admissibility of a hearsay statement under Rule 807.  To reach these conclusions, the 
author researched and reviewed cases in the Westlaw database.  
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manner in which law is practiced.160  We must reserve this highly 
discretionary rubric of determining whether to admit or reject hearsay for 
those few instances when an enumerated hearsay exception simply does 
not fit.  If all hearsay were evaluated under the residual exception’s 
parameters, far too much discretion would inure to trial judges.161 
                                                          
 160.  Attorney-client conversations such as the following would become commonplace: “I don’t 
know if I can represent you, sir, because the records you’ve provided that in essence prove your case 
might not be admitted into evidence by the trial judge.  Historically, such records would have been 
admitted under what we used to call the ‘business records exception,’ but some of the judges in this 
jurisdiction have shown reluctance to admit records such as these, while other judges here have no 
problem admitting these type records.  It all depends on the judge we draw.  But I can’t take that 
chance, considering this would be a contingency case and I wouldn’t even recover my costs if we 
lose, all based on the luck of the draw and some judge’s personal discretion.”  
 161.  As an example of restricting trial judges’ discretion in situations where it appears they may 
have too much, consider criminal sentencing.  Based on research concluding there was wide 
disparity in federal sentencing, in 1984 Congress overwhelmingly passed and President Reagan 
signed into law the Sentencing Reform Act, following the lead of many states that previously had 
enacted their own sentencing reform.  On both the federal and state levels, judges—armed with near 
unfettered discretion—had been issuing vastly disparate sentences for essentially the same crimes.  
Employing a sports analogy, historically every quarter of every basketball game began with a jump 
ball tip-off, wherein the referee would toss the ball up between two opposing players who would 
jump and try to tip the ball to a teammate to obtain possession.  Additionally, every time during the 
game that two opposing players had joint possession of the ball, a jump ball tip-off resulted to 
determine which team would achieve possession.  However, during jump ball tip-offs, referees had 
such a difficult time trying to toss the ball up fairly and completely straight—without inadvertently 
giving an advantage to either player by tossing the ball closer to him—that the rules were changed.  
Now, only the beginning of a basketball game commences with a jump ball tip-off; the beginning of 
each subsequent quarter commences with alternate teams possessing the ball, and every joint 
possession situation is governed by the alternate possession rule.  Because possession of the ball is 
so important and jump ball tip-offs occur at least four times each game (not including joint 
possession situations), the rules drafters felt the need to reduce the number of occasions the referee 
was placed in the position of initiating a jump ball tip-off.  The college game was so concerned with 
this that—unlike high school basketball and professional basketball—the college game simply 
eliminated quarters and now conducts games in two halves, the first half beginning with a jump ball 
tip-off and the second half on alternate possession.  Like determining whether to admit a hearsay 
statement under the residual exception, jump ball tip-offs simply are too discretionary—and 
possession of the ball too important—for the rules drafters to allow jump ball tip-offs to occur too 
frequently.  Similarly, with all deference to Judge Posner (who certainly deserves such, along with 
the author’s immense respect), we must limit, rather than expand, those occasions wherein trial 
judges are faced with the dilemma of relying almost purely on their individual discretion in 
determining whether to admit a hearsay statement under the residual exception.  Everyone comes 
from his own perspective, and the author and Judge Posner are no different.  As a judge, it appears 
Judge Posner trusts judges to assess most—if not all—hearsay evidence under the FED. R. EVID. 
807’s highly-discretionary standard.  As a former practicing attorney who tried multi-million dollar 
cases in federal and state courts, the author desires a less-discretionary rubric for determining the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence so that lawyers going into a trial know what to expect.  We 
removed the massive discretion judges formerly possessed regarding criminal sentencing, enacting 
strict sentencing parameters within which judges may exercise some degree of discretion.  Justice 
must be as predictable as possible, both in criminal sentencing and in the admission of hearsay. 
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B.   The Author’s Proposed Remedy 
Now that this Article has beaten up on the residual exception as a 
means to evaluate and determine the admissibility of all hearsay 
statements, it will attempt to rehabilitate the residual exception—in 
revised form—as a means to evaluate and determine admissibility of 
excited utterances.  Obviously there is a reason Rule 807 exists.  Certain 
statements—a very limited few—simply are so reliable that, even though 
they do not technically fit within the requirements of any of the 
enumerated exceptions, they nonetheless should be heard and considered 
by the jury.  Recognizing this, prior to the enactment of the Rules, both 
the states and the federal judiciary employed a form of the residual or 
catch-all exception.162 
Were Congress to eliminate the excited utterance exception in the 
Federal Rules and states do the same, a statement following a startling 
event that in the past may have been admitted as an excited utterance 
could be analyzed under a rubric similar to the residual exception, albeit 
more definitive and detailed such that the exception also encompasses 
the trustworthiness analysis of the corroboration required under Rule 
804(b)(3), the statement against interest exception when the declarant is 
unavailable.163  Whereas Rule 807, the residual exception, allows trial 
judges wide latitude in assessing the trustworthiness of hearsay 
statements offered under the exception and does not require the declarant 
be unavailable to testify,164 hearsay statements offered under Rule 
804(b)(3) not only require the declarant be unavailable,165 but the 
                                                          
 162.  The exception as we now know it traces back to the famous 1961 Dallas County v. 
Commercial Union Assurance Co. case, the first reported case wherein a court admitted a hearsay 
statement under what we now call the residual exception.  286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).  The 
opinion teemed with judicial and legal lions: Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit wrote 
the opinion—cobbling together rationales employed by Judge Learned Hand and Professor 
Wigmore—approving the admission of a 1901 newspaper article describing an alternate cause for 
the alleged damage to the subject property, based on reliability, necessity, and “common sense,” 
despite the evidence’s failure to fall within the ancient documents exception, the business records 
exception, or “any other readily identifiable and happily tagged species of hearsay exception.”  Id. at 
397–98.  As Judge Wisdom reasoned, why would a newspaper reporter in 1901 lie about a 1901 
courthouse fire?  Id. at 397.  Did the reporter magically know that nearly 60 years later the 
courthouse would collapse and there would be a lawsuit regarding who should pay for the damages, 
and therefore the reporter fabricated the newspaper article in 1901 to protect the 1957 insurance 
company from having to pay on the policy?  See id.  Common sense tells us that the 1901 newspaper 
article possesses a high degree of reliability.  See id. 
 163.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 164.  FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 165.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
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advisory committee notes detail six trustworthiness factors.166  If, in 
situations where a hearsay statement is sought to be admitted under the 
former excited utterance exception, an unavailable hearsay declarant’s 
statement is analyzed employing a hybrid of the Rule 807 residual 
exception’s trustworthiness factors167 and the Rule 804(b)(3) statement 
against interest’s trustworthiness factors, along with a new factor to 
address the potential inaccuracies of an impaired declarant’s excited 
utterance, the system could ensure that these especially vital hearsay 
statements are properly scrutinized before admission into evidence. 
Thus, this Article proposes abolishing Rule 803(2), the excited 
utterance exception, and creating the following hearsay exception as 
Rule 804(b)(7): 
Statement Immediately Subsequent to Startling Event or 
Condition.  A statement made immediately subsequent to a startling 
event or condition that is supported by corroborating circumstances that 
clearly indicate its trustworthiness.168 
                                                          
 166.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
EVIDENCE RULES 23 (2002).  The factors provided by the committee are:  
 
(1) the timing and circumstances under which the statement was made;  
(2) the declarant’s motive in making the statement and whether there was a reason for the 
declarant to lie;  
(3) whether the declarant repeated the statement and did so consistently, even under 
different circumstances;  
(4) the party or parties to whom the statement was made;  
(5) the relationship between the declarant and the opponent of the evidence; and  
(6) the nature and strength of independent evidence relevant to the conduct in question.   
 
Id.  Although the Rule was not enacted in 2002, in 2010 a similar rule was enacted. 
 167.  The factors that have been identified in determining trustworthiness are: (1) the age, 
education, and experience of the declarant; (2) the personal knowledge of the declarant regarding the 
subject matter of the statement; (3) the oral or written nature of the statement; (4) the ambiguity of 
the statement; (5) the consistency with which the statement is repeated (perhaps even in varying 
situations); (6) the time lapse between the event and the making of the statement; (7) the partiality of 
the declarant and the relationship between the declarant and the witness; (8) the declarant’s motive 
to speak truthfully or untruthfully; (9) the spontaneity of the statement, as opposed to responding to 
leading questions; (10) the making of the statement under oath; (11) the declarant being subject to 
cross-examination at the time the statement was made; and, (12) the recantation or repudiation of the 
statement after it was made.  See, e.g., Aamco Transmissions, Inc. v. Baker, 591 F. Supp. 2d 788, 
799 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 168.  Requiring the declarant be unavailable emphasizes the preference for in-court, cross-
examinable testimony before the trier of fact to determine credibility and weight.  Under this new 
rule, only in those cases where the declarant is unavailable would a former “excited utterance” be 
admissible. 
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Requiring the statement be made “immediately” subsequent to the 
event or condition allows trial judges discretion in determining “how 
long is too long” while providing guidance: one day after the event 
clearly is not “immediately subsequent” but perhaps, under the individual 
circumstances, thirty minutes may be considered “immediately 
subsequent.”  The advisory committee notes accompanying the rule 
should include a list of trustworthiness factors that the trial judge must 
evaluate prior to ruling on the admissibility of the statement.  Such 
factors should be: (1) the age, education, and experience of the declarant; 
(2) the personal knowledge of the declarant regarding the subject matter 
of the statement; (3) the physical, mental, and emotional state of the 
declarant at the time the statement was made; (4) the timing and 
circumstances under which the statement was made; (5) the declarant’s 
motive in making the statement and whether there was a reason for the 
declarant to lie; (6) the ambiguity of the statement; (7) the time lapse 
between the event and the making of the statement; (8) the partiality of 
the declarant and the relationship between the declarant and the witness; 
(9) the spontaneity of the statement, as opposed to responding to leading 
questions; (10) whether the declarant repeated the statement and did so 
consistently, even under different circumstances; (11) the relationship 
between the declarant and the opponent of the evidence; (12) the 
recantation or repudiation of the statement after it was made; and, (13) 
the nature and strength of independent evidence relevant to the conduct 
in question.  Twelve of these thirteen factors are an amalgamation of the 
trustworthiness factors included in the advisory committee notes 
accompanying Rules 804(b)(3) and 807.169  The third enumerated factor 
is created to address the risk of inaccuracy based on the state/condition of 
the declarant.  Enumerated factors five, eight, and eleven specifically 
address the traditional concern of fabrication/perjury. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Judge Posner rightfully criticized the excited utterance exception, 
based on the psychological data and the other risks this Article has 
examined; however, the call to abolish all hearsay exceptions contained 
in Rules 801 through 806 and simply transfer them into the residual 
catch-all does not appear to be the best solution, at least for the excited 
utterance.  There is a reason this exception exists, but its utility and 
                                                          
 169.  See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES, supra note 166, 
at 23. 
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reliability are highly suspect under its current iteration.  Eliminating Rule 
803(2) and creating Rule 804(b)(7) would address the concerns 
expressed by Judge Posner and legal commentators while providing for 
the admissibility of those statements we should and do trust.  Professor 
Wigmore may not agree, but it’s time we abolish the excited utterance 
exception as currently written and applied in favor of a more detailed, 
more reliable exception. 
 
